Advance warnings 7 October 2023

 

September 16, 2026

In September 2026, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz published an investigative article based on an upcoming book by journalists Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yuval. According to the report, a week and a half before the October 7, 2023, attack by the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas, Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to warn him of a “massive” attack planned by Yahya Sinwar; the conversation between the ruler of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly lasted 45 minutes. The Prime Minister’s Office has dismissed the entire story as completely false.

The book’s claims are viewed—particularly within the governing coalition—as politically motivated, given that only about a month and a half remains until the elections. In my view, the claim regarding the call is supported by other early warning signs; alongside the MbZ claim, I will discuss the warning call made to Netanyahu’s office by the head of Egyptian intelligence just before the October 7 attack, the “Jericho Wall” attack plan seized by the IDF from Hamas, and early warnings issued by IDF Military Intelligence and Shin Bet.

MbZ

“We passed warnings on to the Israelis. They did nothing with them.” (former Fatah official Mohammed Dahlan days after the onslaught)

MbZ’s call reportedly took place after information regarding the attack had been relayed—via an advisor to the UAE President—to Israel’s domestic intelligence agency, Shin Bet, in mid-September 2023. According to the report, this crucial intelligence originated directly from Sinwar. Shin Bet reportedly failed to correctly interpret the information as a threat of full-scale war emanating from the Gaza Strip; consequently, MbZ, concerned by Israel’s tepid response, called Netanyahu directly. However, Netanyahu reportedly did not share the content of the call with Israel’s security leadership, including Shin Bet.

Mohammed Dahlan—a well-connected Palestinian living in exile who was once one of the most influential men in the Mediterranean region, known as the “Sheriff of Gaza”—was apparently also present on the Emirati side during the call.

President Isaac Herzog, who maintains close ties with MbZ, told Haaretz that the UAE President had been concerned about the situation even before the war. “He spoke to me about it a lot in the months leading up to the war,” he said.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instructed his lawyers to file a defamation suit against the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, journalist Shlomi Eldar, and other parties. These actions follow the publication of reports regarding the alleged call from MbZ prior to October 7, 2023.

According to the Prime Minister’s Office, no call from MbZ was found in its call logs. This is hardly surprising, given that—according to the report—a representative from the UAE embassy brought a specially encrypted phone to Netanyahu’s office to ensure the confidentiality of the conversation; consequently, there is no point in looking for a record of it in the logs.

Shin Bet

Less than a week before the October 7 attack, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 1, 2023. He recommended the targeted assassination of Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader in Gaza, as well as several other assassinations targeting the organization’s senior figures. According to a security source, Bar told Netanyahu that Shin Bet had detected Hamas “preparing something extreme,” even using the term “earthquake” during the discussion. The source confirmed that this information was presented to the Prime Minister, but Netanyahu did not approve the proposal.

On the morning of October 7, Shin Bet received several warning signals, sparking urgent consultations both within the agency’s leadership and between Shin Bet and the IDF. All parties concluded that it was merely an exercise—similar to those Hamas had conducted several times over the past year. Nevertheless, Shin Bet remained concerned that something might be afoot—possibly a kidnapping—and decided to deploy the “Tequila” team to the south. Some of the senior officials mentioned here have accepted responsibility for the intelligence failure that resulted in the inability to prevent the attack. Among them, the most prominent figures are Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, Military Intelligence chief Haliva, and the head of the Research Division, Sa’ar.

Egypt’s Early Warning

According to multiple reports, Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel contacted Prime Minister Netanyahu days before the attack and warned that Hamas was preparing an “unusual and horrific operation.” The content of the warning was similar to that issued by MbZ, but Netanyahu’s response was the same: “The situation in Gaza is under control. Our problem is in the West Bank, and that is where we are directing our forces.”

Some reports offer a different interpretation. According to IDF Radio, the warning issued by Egyptian intelligence was “general” in nature and lacked specifics; the then-head of Shin Bet assessed that the warning might have related to Israeli hostages held by Hamas rather than a large-scale military attack.

Many independent media outlets and individuals have confirmed the warning issued to Netanyahu by Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel prior to the attack:

Israel’s Ynetnews: A major Israeli news site reported in detail that, three days before the attack, Egyptian intelligence chief Kamel contacted Netanyahu’s office to warn of an “unusual, horrific operation.”

Israel’s The Jerusalem Post: Reported a statement by opposition leader Yair Lapid, in which he claimed that the Egyptian government had stated it warned Netanyahu, and that the Prime Minister should have prevented the massacre. The BBC (UK): Its Arabic-language channel reported that Netanyahu responded to Kamel’s warning by stating that Israel is well aware of the situation in Gaza and has it under control, whereas the primary threat lies in the West Bank.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett: He publicly stated he knew that Egyptian intelligence chief Kamel had conveyed a warning to Netanyahu just before the attack.

Hungarian news site HVG: Cited Nimrod Novik, an advisor to former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who said he had personally seen the document containing the warning Egypt sent to Israel prior to the attack and believed Netanyahu had received it as well.

Egyptian source: The Israeli outlet Ynetnews quoted Egyptian officials as saying they would not retract or alter their statement “by even a millimeter” and reaffirmed that they had indeed sent the warning.

“Jericho Wall” – Attack Plan

In May 2022, the IDF received the “Jericho Wall” attack plan—a true intelligence gem. This is the codename given by Israeli intelligence officials to a document of approximately 40 pages obtained from Hamas. It details how the border fence and fortifications along the Israel-Gaza border would be breached and how Israeli towns and military bases (including a division headquarters) would be captured.

Unlike earlier material from 2018, which was described as being rather general in nature, the updated version contained clearer operational features. The operational plan was developed by Raad Saad, who had served as the head of operations for Hamas’s military wing since the late 2010s (and whom the IDF eliminated on December 13, 2025). He translated the strategic vision of Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif into a detailed plan of action—a “plan to defeat the IDF’s Gaza Division”—as the document’s primary objective was specifically the destruction of the Gaza Division.

The plan’s key elements were:

Rockets: A heavy rocket barrage at the start of the attack to divert the soldiers’ attention and force them into shelters.
Drones: Unmanned aerial vehicles used to disable border surveillance cameras and automated machine guns. Infiltration: Waves of fighters crossing the border on foot, on motorcycles, and using paragliders.
Objectives: Seizing Israeli military bases—such as the Gaza Division headquarters at Re’im—and capturing border communities.

Senior military and intelligence officials categorized the document as an aspirational vision or a framework for force development rather than an imminent threat, believing Hamas lacked the capabilities to execute the plan. Intelligence officers and lower-ranking soldiers raised the alarm in July 2023 after observing Hamas exercises that mirrored the plan, yet the leadership took no action.

For years, units composed of young female conscripts stationed at the Gaza border had a single mission: to sit for hours at surveillance posts and watch for any signs of suspicious activity. In the month leading up to October 7, 2023, they observed and reported various suspicious incidents along the border to their superiors. There was a systemic failure within the IDF, as these warnings largely went unheeded. And, precisely in accordance with the “Jericho Wall” plan, these border-monitoring “eyes” were forced into bomb shelters by rocket fire—after the border surveillance cameras had first been blinded, just as the plan had outlined. Catastrophic Failures by IDF Military Intelligence

A Catastrophic Failure by IDF Military Intelligence

The intelligence provided by the IDF’s Unit 8200—the “Jericho Wall” attack plan—was a veritable goldmine; it contained everything: details on the deployment of IDF forces (in chilling detail) and methods for countering them, instructions for breaching the border barrier and executing the attack, and a description of targets and objectives both during and after the assault.

According to reports, the document was seen by only a few high-ranking military intelligence officials, including the then-head of Military Intelligence Aharon Haliva, Unit 8200 commander Yossi Sariel, Gaza Division commander Avi Rosenfeld, and the then-commander of the Southern Command, Eliezer Toledano. The document was not seen by Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Gallant, or IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi. Halevi only learned of the “Jericho Wall” document about two weeks after the war began.

Military intelligence officials obtained the document but assessed that Hamas was either incapable of carrying out such a large-scale attack or unwilling to do so; consequently, they dismissed it as “wishful thinking” or an unrealistic plan. This dismissive assessment prevented the document from reaching the political level.

If the political leadership or the wider military establishment was unaware of the “Jericho Wall” material, this constituted a failure—or rather, a catastrophic error. It was no ordinary piece of information but a groundbreaking document that should have led to one of two courses of action: either a fundamental shift in mindset—abandoning the assumption that Hamas could be deterred and sought peace and stability—or efforts to discredit this valuable intelligence so that the prevailing view could be maintained.

The IDF and Military Intelligence

Military Intelligence’s renowned Unit 8200 and its research division failed to synthesize the available information, even though warning signs—which should have sounded alarm bells across the board and triggered new intelligence-gathering efforts to thwart an attack—were flashing red.

Unit 8200 failed to take the initiative on the matter as it should have. Its commander, Brigadier General Y., was content with having obtained a valuable intelligence report but neglected efforts to ensure—both within the unit and externally—that the information was effectively utilized. He failed to establish a comprehensive intelligence model to monitor or disrupt Hamas’s plans, nor did he create a warning system that would have enabled the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to prepare for the threat. Furthermore, he did not advance preparations within his unit, alter the focus of sensitive intelligence gathering, or discuss the issue with the IDF’s senior leadership; above all, he failed to reactivate several sub-units that had been disbanded during his tenure. These included Unit 8200 departments—such as those dedicated to tactical communications (handheld radios) and open-source intelligence (OSINT)—that could have made a significant contribution to operations aligned with the intelligence community’s concept of “I&W” (indications and warnings). The commander of Unit 8200 was not solely to blame for the lapses: Brigadier General G., the head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate’s Operations Division, failed to take any significant steps to understand what was actually happening in Gaza. The Operations Division had been established as a key lesson learned from the Second Lebanon War; its goal was to synchronize all intelligence activities to focus on Military Intelligence’s primary mission—providing timely warning of war. Brigadier General Amit Sa’ar, the head of the Military Intelligence Research Division—himself an experienced intelligence officer with deep expertise regarding Gaza and the Palestinians—also bore a share of the responsibility, as he failed to insist on mobilizing all available intelligence methods to ensure Hamas could not catch them off guard.

On October 3, Aharon Haliva, the head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate, visited a key Unit 8200 data-gathering base in southern Israel. The visit took place during the Sukkot holiday, and Haliva was in the midst of a very busy workday. He began his visit with a meeting at the headquarters of the 91st Division—responsible for the Galilee region—to assess the division’s intelligence readiness regarding Hezbollah; Afterward, he visited the 210th Division operating in the Golan Heights to ensure the situation on the Syrian front was under control, then flew on to the Negev to assess the situation in the Gaza sector.

Stationed at the base he visited was an experienced non-commissioned officer—who later became “famous”—who had long and repeatedly warned that something was brewing in Gaza: something strange and different from the prevailing belief. He believed that the military exercises and diversionary maneuvers observed near the border fence were part of a large-scale plan that would culminate in an attack. NCO V. compared this suspected plan against the reality on the ground and tried to make his views heard. He sent three detailed emails on the matter, but they were dismissed with the claim that the scenario he described was unrealistic.

The only ones willing to listen to him and support his assessment were his immediate colleagues. His direct superior, P., even cut his leave short to attend a meeting with the head of military intelligence that day. He tried to warn the general, but Haliva completely disregarded what he had to say.

In May 2024, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) officially confirmed that Netanyahu had received four separate warning letters from military intelligence between March and July 2023. On October 7, 2023, the Gaza Division was severely understaffed, and its troops were dispersed across various assignments. According to the IDF’s own investigations, there were only 767 soldiers in the Gaza Division’s area of ​​operations at the time, whereas the attacking Hamas fighters numbered approximately 5,000.

My Summary

A research article published in the RUSI Journal—the flagship publication of the leading defense and security think tank, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)—states, among other things, the following:

Although there was ample evidence that intelligence analysts had detected a clear shift in Hamas’s modus operandi—pointing to a potential, game-changing attack—these assessments never carried enough weight to alter prevailing assumptions (and thus the causal logic) within a hierarchical structure where the political priorities defined by the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem remained unchanged.

Despite early warnings, the worst-case scenario unfolded on October 7, 2023. However, the aforementioned intelligence failures do not in the slightest diminish the responsibility of the political leadership—and, above all, the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is the architect of the Gaza failure; he is the man who built up and strengthened Hamas and, crucially, handled it with kid gloves, blocking all proposals and attempts to strike the organization’s leadership (even though the heads of Shin Bet had presented him with several detailed plans to do so in recent years). It was Netanyahu’s duty to know, to ask, to press, and to demand. He did none of these things; on the contrary, he sought to reinforce and maintain the prevailing perception of the situation. He was the man who dispatched the head of Mossad to arrange for the delivery of “suitcases full of cash” to Hamas from Qatar; …who viewed Hamas as a preferable alternative to the Palestinian Authority; who exchanged messages with Sinwar; whose focus was entirely on Saudi Arabia and who believed the Palestinian issue had been resolved; and who disregarded all the strategic warnings received over the past year indicating that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had significantly weakened and that Israel’s enemies viewed the situation as an opportune moment to strike.

A senior Israeli official who participated in security discussions prior to the attack told Channel 12 that “they might have reached different conclusions and acted differently had Netanyahu informed them of the reported warning [from MbZ and Egypt] that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was preparing a large-scale operation”; another official noted: “Had we known, we would at least have investigated the matter more thoroughly.”

Just as was the case exactly 50 years earlier (during the Yom Kippur War), early warnings from non-commissioned officers and field personnel were disregarded—at the latest at the general level, if they reached that far at all. Likewise, the upper echelons of the political, military, and intelligence establishments ignored warnings from abroad, clinging to a situational assessment that proved incorrect and underestimating the adversary. (I discussed these early warnings regarding the Yom Kippur War in my article “The Yom Kippur War: Critical Perspectives on the Eve of the Attack,” published on October 6, 2023.) The truth regarding the aforementioned matters and other early warnings will likely only come to light once an independent commission of inquiry—the establishment of which the opposition has repeatedly demanded but Netanyahu has refused to authorize—completes its work. The commission formed after the Yom Kippur War (1973), at least, conducted a thorough investigation, even though—as noted—the same mistakes were repeated fifty years later.

Sources e.g:  Der Spiegel , Jerusalem Post , IsraelHayom , Times of Israel , ynetNews , ynetGlobal , The New York Times and SoMe and publication Jones, C., & Geist Pinfold, R. (2025). Israel and the Politics of Intelligence Failure on 7 October. The RUSI Journal, 170(3), 40–50.

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The article first appeared – in Finnish – in the online publication Ariel-Israelista suomeksi

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