Filling Iran’s Power Vacuum

March 6, 2026

The departure of Iran’s Supreme Leader – Ali Khamenei – has left a power vacuum in the country, a filling process to which the ongoing war and uprising bring their own twists. Formally, the new Supreme Leader is chosen by the Assembly of Experts (an 88-member expert body). The process is not a direct popular election, but an internal religious-political decision. As an interim solution, especially now during wartime, a leadership council bears the responsibility for his duties instead of a single Supreme Leader.

Credit: https://www.the-star.co.ke/, public domain

I personally see three different, more or less likely scenarios for Iran’s leadership during or immediately after the war:

1. A change of the power structure through an uprising towards parliamentarism,
2. The theocratic power structure remains, with continuity through a new leader,
3. The theocratic power structure transforms in a more technocratic, reformist direction, allowing superficial reforms and improvements in human rights.

The following is my assessment of the scenarios based on the situation on March 5, 2026.

Revolution through Uprising

If the Iranian uprising continues for a longer period, i.e., weeks, it could lead to a revolution, especially if the leadership and equipment of the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) are significantly destroyed, and particularly if the army opens its weapons arsenals and/or the IRGC technocrats defect to the side of the uprising to preserve their economic and other interests.

Reza Pahlavi, Credit: Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 2.0

A successful uprising would lead to an interim administration, with Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi likely as its formal leader. He is very popular among the diaspora; within Iran, opinions are divided and familiarity is weaker. In the absence of better-known or more prominent opposition figures, the Crown Prince, as a unifying factor, could lead the country to free elections and the replacement of the previous clerical rule with parliamentarism. The new parliament could then decide on the country’s constitution and, for example, whether the country develops into a constitutional monarchy or a traditional Western-style democracy.

A New Leader for the Old Power Structure

The Assembly of Experts has delayed the election of a new Supreme Leader under wartime conditions. Based on general analyses, the leading candidates in the current situation, assuming they are still alive, are as follows:

Mojtaba Khamenei Credit: Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 2.0

1️⃣ Mojtaba Khamenei is the son of the slain former leader, Ali Khamenei, and has close ties to the Revolutionary Guard. He holds no official position in the top leadership but is often mentioned as a behind-the-scenes influencer. If the choice leans towards ensuring continuity, he is likely the next Supreme Leader of Iran.

2️⃣ Sadeq Larijani has been prominent during the war. He is a former head of the judiciary and a member of the Guardian Council, has long experience at the core of the system, and represents the conservative line.

3️⃣ Hassan Khomeini is the grandson of the charismatic founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and holds religious authority. He is perceived as more moderate than others and is therefore not the favorite of the system’s hard core.

4️⃣ Alireza Arafi is a member of the Assembly of Experts, holding a high religious position but with a lower political profile compared to others. He currently serves on the interim leadership council.

The Structure Remains by Reducing Theocracy and Increasing Technocracy

Hassan Khomeini, Credit: Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 2.0

A key power factor is the IRGC, which can guide the Assembly of Experts’ choice behind the scenes. The pragmatic wing of the Revolutionary Guard would likely favor a candidate who guarantees its economic and military advantages. In this scenario, the religious leader would be more symbolic – with real power residing with the security apparatus.

Mojtaba Khamenei is the strongest guarantor of continuity, but his tenure could be very short if the war continues. The ongoing elimination of IRGC and religious “ultra-conservative” leaders could increase the importance of pragmatists.

In this scenario, Hassan Khomeini could, in theory, symbolize a “softer” phase of the system. Currently, the hardline IRGC or hardline clergy would not support him, but the situation could change with the war. Khomeini’s strength is his strong symbolic religious capital through his heritage, and his moderate image appeals to some reformists. Hassan Khomeini could also appeal to nostalgic circles of the revolution.

Hassan Rouani, Credit: Wikipedia,
CC BY-SA 2.0

Another possible leader in this scenario, perhaps even more reform-minded but still preserving the structure, could be Iran’s former president, Hassan Rouhani. Although he is a cleric, he was not elected to the Assembly of Experts for being too moderate. Even though Rouhani is a long-time insider of the system (IRGC + conservative clergy), he is considered less reliable by the current IRGC, precisely because of his perceived pro-Western stance, for example, during the nuclear deal negotiations. Rouhani, as a technocrat, could, in my view, gain the support of reformists and the middle class and might engage in genuine dialogue with representatives of the uprising.

Epilogue

Of the three scenarios mentioned above, I consider the change of the power structure through an uprising the most desirable, while also deeming it the least likely option in the short term. Elections and parliamentarism do not in themselves guarantee a democratic, moderate Iran, as seen, for example, in the Palestinian territories following elections. In my view, democracy can be guaranteed by the Iranians themselves, who, unlike the Palestinians, represent an ancient culture that has kept them largely immune to decades of hate indoctrination. Especially the educated urban youth are oriented towards a better future, rather than wallowing in the past and hatred of Israel. I believe this internal force will lead to success in the longer term.

In the short term, Iran’s Assembly of Experts will likely elect Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader, and after his possible demise, a similar leader from the hard core of the power structure (IRGC + conservative clergy). As the war continues, the hard core will lose members and power to technocrats and pragmatists.

A critical factor for the outcome is when the war ends. The United States faces great internal pressure to end the war quickly, and President Donald Trump will likely make a deal at the first opportunity to celebrate a great victory and his own excellence. In that case, Israel’s activity regarding Iran would also decrease; it might prefer to focus its military efforts on disarming Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran’s technocratic leadership could very well make a new nuclear program deal and other formal concessions to ensure peace and preserve its power.

In my opinion, the most desirable outcome would be for the war to continue at least long enough for the hard core of Iran’s power structure to break, ensuring the possibility of replacing the theocratic system.

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The article first appeared in the online publication Ariel-Israelista suomeksi