A Pause in the Israeli Fronts

December 7, 2025

Israel’s victorious seven-front war is now in a lull in December 2025. As for Gaza, Lebanon and Iran, the Middle East is in a state of hiatus, a new war on these fronts could escalate at any time in the next couple of months. Iran’s proxy armies in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and the arming Palestinian territories are gathering their forces but, in my opinion, are not capable of a significant, larger-scale attack on Israel.

On the first civil front – the information war – Israel is still losing. Hamas has succeeded in its marketing campaign, among other things by spreading massive disinformation, in gaining support for its cause in the West, and since its massive terrorist attack on 7/10/2023, anti-Semitic attacks have multiplied worldwide and especially in the West. The situation may now be improving as the disinformation transmitted by Hamas and even uncritically shared by Western countries, as well as the misinformation propagated by the UN and other organizations about starvation and genocide, is revealed. The participation of Muslim countries in the peace plan, which has also been discussed at the UN, paves the way for the search for peaceful solutions.

The second civilian front, or home front, in Israel seems to be returning to the pre-war era with the peace plan, with the stance on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the reform of the judiciary and the extension of conscription to members of religious extremist groups as sticking points.

Gaza

On October 9, 2025, US President Donald Trump’s so-called 20-point peace plan for Gaza, which was later approved by the UN Security Council, was also signed. The first phase of the plan included, among other things, the handover of hostages taken by Hamas to Israel, the release of Palestinians sentenced or detained by Israel, a ceasefire, increased humanitarian aid, and the withdrawal of the Israeli army (IDF) to the so-called Yellow Line within 72 hours. Now, almost two months after the agreement, the first phase is still underway, with Hamas delaying, in particular, the handover of the bodies of the dead hostages. Hamas has used the time to execute and eliminate its local opponents in Gaza and to attack Israel across the Yellow Line. The latest example of the “civil war” in Gaza is the leader of the anti-Hamas militia, Yasser Abu Shabab, who led the “people’s forces” allied with Israel against Hamas. He was seriously wounded, evacuated to Soroka Hospital in Israel, and died of his injuries there.

All this so that the second phase of the peace plan – including, among other things, the disarmament of Hamas – could not begin.

There are conflicting reports about Hamas’s grip on Gaza and its future plans as the first phase of the ceasefire draws to a close. In practice, Gaza is divided: The eastern sector, known as the “Green Zone,” lies east of the Yellow Line and is under full IDF control. This Green Zone is home to five Palestinian militia groups that oppose Hamas and provide an internal counterweight to Hamas’s influence in the area. The western area, the “Red Zone,” is under Hamas control, extending west of the Yellow Line. At its widest point, this Hamas-controlled strip is about 5 km wide. Between the Philadelphia Corridor on the Egyptian border and the Red Zone, Israel maintains a 1.7 km wide corridor that it controls. This strip is intended to prevent smuggling and to prevent the flow of weapons and supplies into Hamas-controlled territory.

The most recent body released from Gaza has been identified as Sudthisak Rinthalak, a native of northern Thailand who had been working in Israel as a farm laborer since 2017. On October 7, a total of 39 Thai citizens were murdered and 31 were taken prisoner. Israeli police officer Ran Givili, who is said to have eliminated 14 terrorists before he was killed and his body was taken to Gaza, remains hostage in Gaza.

Lebanon

The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, which was signed a year ago, is breaking down. Lebanese sources claim (whether it was a deliberate leak or not) that the decision to attack Lebanon has already been made, and was “leaked” by high-ranking Americans.

The Israel Defense Forces have begun construction of a new concrete wall on the northern border at the tip of Jal al-Deir – opposite the village of Maroun al-Ras. The new fence is reportedly located about two kilometers inside Lebanese territory. Israel is pressuring the Lebanese army to search for Hezbollah weapons in private homes in the south after the group repositioned itself (after finding extensive rocket launchers in people’s attics and bedrooms). Lebanon is slowing down, fearing unrest and an expansion of the operation that could trigger a new conflict.

According to a Lebanese source, the United States gave Lebanon a month (actually until the end of the year) to resolve the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament, the United States has begun evacuating embassy personnel, and Israel is launching targeted strikes and is awaiting Hezbollah’s response. Syrian regime leader Julian Assange has reduced surveillance of border crossings with Lebanon, allowing Hezbollah to increase arms smuggling.

Direct talks between Israeli and Lebanese civil authorities were held on December 4, 2025, in Naqoura, on the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanese border, under the leadership of US Ambassador Morgan Ortagus. Israel was represented in Naqoura by Uri Resnick, a senior official in the National Security Council, and Lebanon by Simon Karam, a Maronite Christian who previously served as Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Nations. Representatives from the Israel Defense Forces, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and the United Nations also attended the meeting. The meeting was rare in that it was the first direct meeting between Israeli and Lebanese civilian officials since the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991.

The talks focused not only on the implementation of the 2024 ceasefire agreement, but also on issues such as the maritime border, gas exploration, the return of residents to border communities and even possible cooperation in agriculture. The entire process is underpinned by the US demand for Hezbollah to disarm by December 31.

Iran

The Institute for National Security Studies claimed that Iran has sent Hezbollah around $1 billion in the past four months through smuggling routes in northern Iraq, Syria and Turkey, despite an unprecedented domestic water crisis, ongoing power outages and severe air pollution. Intelligence sources reveal that Iran is rapidly arming Palestinian factions in Judea and Samaria through Hezbollah and Syrian smuggling networks. The weapons include missiles, explosive drones, anti-tank guided missiles (RPGs). According to reports, Syrian authorities have relaxed controls on the Lebanese border, allowing Hezbollah to rearm with more than 4,000 rockets and 250 drones. This escalation underscores Tehran’s broader regional strategy to entrench proxies beyond Israel’s borders.

In November, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a new resolution demanding access to Iran’s nuclear facilities and information on Iran’s uranium stockpiles at facilities targeted by the United States and Israel. Iran has given no indication of what happened to these stockpiles. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated publicly that the agency was ready to continue inspections and re-engage with Iran, but so far the Iranians are not interested in any kind of cooperation.

Several Israeli news sources have reported, citing unnamed Israeli security officials, that a new “preventive measure” against the Iranian regime’s ballistic missile program is considered “imminent.” Officials are concerned that the program is rapidly recovering and expanding, and assessments suggest that Israel may act again to disrupt its growing capabilities.

Iran’s proxy armies

Iran has reportedly transferred hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah over the past year through a network of companies based in Dubai. Political tensions between Iran and Lebanon have risen after remarks by a senior adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, who claimed that Hezbollah’s existence was more important to Lebanon than bread and water. Iran and the Houthis condemned the Israeli military’s operation to arrest terror suspects in Beit Jinn, southern Syria. Iran’s foreign ministry praised the “resistance” of young Syrians in the face of “Israeli aggression.”

Credit: IFMAT, public domain

“Expert sources in Yemen” claimed that there are differences of opinion among the Houthis over the movement’s continued relations with Iran. The report states that the Houthi movement is in a phase of reorganization, with two competing approaches to the extent of relations with Iran and the level of independence that the Houthis should maintain in the next phase: the “independence stream,” which includes young field commanders and influential figures who believe the movement has reached a position where it can make its own military decisions without turning to a de-empowered Iran; and the “full-connection stream,” which includes Houthi ideological and cultural leaders who see Iran as a strategic guarantee of the Houthis’ existence and argue that any attempt to break away from it would expose the Houthis to a regional and international confrontation that they cannot tolerate.

Arab media claims that the reorganization of the Houthi movement is a competition between two different approaches to the future of relations with Iran. A senior official in a pro-Iranian Iraqi militia said they were working with the Houthis to upgrade their military capabilities and threatened to prepare an updated list of targets that would “harm the usurping community [Israel]” if a new campaign broke out. The US special envoy for Syria and Lebanon reportedly warned the Iraqi prime minister that Israel would attack Iraq if the militias helped Hezbollah.

Iraq’s pro-Iran Nujaba movement claimed that the Iraqi “resistance movement” was working with the Houthis in Yemen to “upgrade their weapons and military technology” in preparation for future operations. In an interview with Iran’s Tasnim news agency, al-Yasser said that the Houthis’ advanced missile technology, precision operations, and GPS technologies opened up space for broader cooperation that the militia could use to develop its own capabilities.

According to Kurdish sources, the Iraqi Committee for Freezing Terrorist Assets has frozen all movable, immovable and financial assets of the Lebanese Hezbollah movement and the Yemeni Ansarullah movement (Huthi), citing their “participation in a terrorist attack”.

The situation in Syria is volatile. Israel is bracing for the possibility that extremist groups such as ISIS and others could take control of Syria if al-Sharaa is assassinated. This reflects growing concerns that the internal collapse in Syria could open the door for jihadist organizations to expand their influence on Israel’s northern front. On the other hand, the current Syrian regime has – unofficially – indicated that there is no obstacle to the establishment of an American base in the Damascus area to ensure stability in southern Syria.

The recent Israeli ground attack in the Beit Jinn area of ​​Syria has angered Syrians, who have pressured their government to retaliate. Israeli officials said the operation targeted Hezbollah and Hamas members operating in Syria who were planning imminent attacks against Israel. The village of Beit Jinn has served as a terrorist base.

Famine at the forefront of information warfare

“They couldn’t find a famine – so they made one” (COGAT)

From the very beginning of the war, Hamas has been marketing the Israeli-caused famine in Gaza. UN agencies and the media “bought” these stories for political reasons.

Richard Goldberger, a senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, bluntly states:

“The IPC quietly changed its guidelines only for Gaza, hoping that no one would notice before an unfounded famine declaration could be made. This is not just a potential global fraud; it is a serious undermining of the important guidelines and measurement standards that aid agencies follow in areas in need around the world.”

The recent resignation of the BBC management after an internal report showed that much of the BBC’s reporting on Gaza was deeply flawed and contained manipulated material, quotes from terrorists and terrorist sympathizers posing as impartial observers, and outright lies. (Previously, the BBC’s senior management resigned due to systematic bias regarding Gaza and the editing of Trump’s speech).Yle, which operates in Finland, has not yet revised its policy, let alone dismissed it.

With the help of the information war, Hamas managed to mislead the UN and other organizations and the media, as well as the International Criminal Court (ICC), which justified the arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant on the grounds that starvation was used as a tool of warfare and a crime against humanity.

Home Front

“What is needed is bold, determined and transformative leadership. Leadership that both recognizes failures and dares to drive change. Not leadership that intimidates and suppresses, but leadership that uplifts – leadership that inspires. Not leadership that evades, but one that looks the truth in the eye and sets a new direction.” (IDF Commander Eyal Zamir)

According to reports, Prime Minister Netanyahu has decided in the coming weeks to push through controversial legislation that would formalize draft exemptions for Israel’s ultra-Orthodox minority. Logically, this is the only way to prevent early elections (which he has reportedly been considering in recent weeks) now, and the only way to hold on to his ultra-Orthodox partners after the next election.

Netanyahu may face opposition within his own ruling Likud party, with up to five coalition lawmakers reportedly opposing the bill, drafted by Netanyahu ally Boaz Bismuth. Bismuth replaced Yuli Edelstein as chairman of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

The draft law for the ultra-Orthodox has been a long-standing challenge. For the prime minister, it pits his commitment to his ultra-Orthodox allies in protecting and maintaining the religious studies of ultra-Orthodox men against the nation’s desire for a more even burden-sharing. The problem has been exacerbated by the disproportionate sacrifices made by reservists over the past two years.

The scandal pits coalition politicians against the judiciary, in parallel with a controversial judicial reform that was widely discussed in the months leading up to October 7 and has been a source of intense public discord in Israel. A good background on this topic is in BICOM’s analysis The ultra-Orthodox and the future of the People’s Army .

Credit: Yaakov Katz, public domain

In addition to the ultra-Orthodox conscription law, Israeli domestic politics is characterized by an ongoing dispute between the government and the Supreme Court (judicial reform) and, now, a new issue, the pardon application submitted by Benjamin Netanyahu to President Isaac Herzog. The president is currently considering the conditions under which the pardon could be granted in order to end the corruption and other trials that have been going on against Netanyahu for years and to remove the threat of punishment against him.

Epilogue

Events in the Middle East have a much greater significance than the regional conflict, both indirectly through the media and directly through the parties to the conflict. For example, the disarmament of Hamas is not necessarily limited to Gaza. On November 19, 2025, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office announced the end of a complex counter-terrorism operation carried out in cooperation with Mossad and European law enforcement agencies. The operation led to the dismantling of a Hamas network preparing terrorist attacks in Europe. According to the announcement, arrests were made in Germany, Austria and Great Britain, and large weapons caches were found in Austria and possibly elsewhere. The terrorists coordinated their activities with Hamas operatives in Turkey and Qatar.

In summary, I estimate that the ceasefire in Gaza will end at the turn of the year when Hamas refuses to lay down its weapons and when the international forces under the peace plan do not disarm, this will remain the responsibility of the IDF. In Lebanon, the ceasefire with Hezbollah could end in the same way after the turn of the year, although there are hopes that US pressure will finally get the Lebanese government to act as planned in the ceasefire agreement; according to some estimates, there is a growing shift in Lebanese thinking – more and more people now see that dismantling Hezbollah serves the interests of Israel, Lebanon and the whole world. In Iran, a repeat of the 12-day war is, in my opinion, very likely at any time, as Iran continues its nuclear and missile programs. In Syria, Israel is trying to get the al-Sharaa regime to commit to a demilitarized southern Syria.

Sources e.g: BICOMScience , Times of Israel BICOM , The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, , SoMe

______________________________________________________________________________________________________

This is the English version of an article (in Finnish) that first appeared in the online publication  Ariel-Israelista suomeksi .

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Serbia – Overthrow of the President Is the Easy Part

Some Aspects of Israel, Refugees and UN Bias

Some progress with Moldova/Transdnistria dispute on 2008