During and after the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, which is now in a ceasefire, Iranians have been encouraged to hold demonstrations against the current Iranian regime and in support of Israel not only in various parts of the Western world but also inside Iran – although in Iran they are small and life-threatening. At the same time, citizens in many places have openly opposed members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) when they remarked on women without headscarves. Abroad, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is trying to unite the now fragmented opposition that opposes the current Iranian regime.
The situation now raises hopes of a popular uprising and a change of power, and the opportunity for this is the best in decades. The success of the popular uprising is not at all self-evident, as the theocracy-supporting IRGC has taken major countermeasures, including mass arrests of representatives of Iran’s Jewish minority on charges of supporting Israel.
War as an enabler of the uprising
During the 12-day war, Iran launched nearly 600 missiles and over 1,000 drones at civilian population centers, killing about 30 civilians. For example, the attacks on May 23, 2025, killed more than 700 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), especially in the cities of Tehran and Karaj. This underscores the scale of the Israeli operation and its potentially devastating impact on Iran’s military leadership and infrastructure. Iran’s much-touted regional proxy network—Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis—largely refrained from joining the war. Hezbollah did not fire a single rocket, while the Houthis launched only two missiles in 12 days. Iran’s close backers—Russia and China—provided no assistance to the country. This isolation of Iran greatly strengthened Israel’s international legitimacy to carry out its attacks.
The war was effectively ended by a US bunker buster strike on Iran’s key underground facilities, Iran’s apparent response to it, and a ceasefire brokered by Qatar and the US, among others, between Israel and Iran.
The 12-day war significantly weakened Iran’s theocratic regime; in addition to the planners of the nuclear program, Israel eliminated a significant number of the IRGC’s top military leadership. At the same time, unconfirmed reports have emerged from inside Iran of a possible assassination of Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Mojtaba, widely known as a radical hardliner and likely successor to his aging father, was killed at close range in Tehran. If confirmed, this could send shockwaves through the Iranian leadership and deepen the crisis further.
As a small detail, Israel also directly attacked Iran’s Evin prison, a facility for political prisoners, blowing up its entrance.
Israel’s role
The good relations between Israel and Persia go back far into history, to the time of Cyrus the Great (c. 576–529 BCE); he allowed Jews expelled by the Babylonians to return to Israel and even financed the construction of the Temple in Jerusalem. Iran’s secularization is beneficial to Israel. This is not surprising, since Israel and Iran had excellent relations before the 1978-79 Islamic revolution. The Jewish community in Iran is the oldest continuously existing Jewish community in the world. The community is as significant in the diaspora as it is in Iran. Many now envision the so-called “Cyrus Accords,” i.e. a renewed friendship between Iranians and Israelis, similar to the already partially realized “Abraham Accords,” by which Israel has normalized its relations with several Muslim countries. In this way, Israel would, as it were, repay its debt from the time of Cyrus by freeing Iranians from the shackles of theocracy.
Israel’s unofficial goal has been to overthrow the current Iranian regime. Mossad was very active even before the war and, with the support of the Iranian state, even established a drone factory in Iran; during the war, these drones were used “at close range” to destroy Iran’s air defenses and other military infrastructure. Similarly, cells operating in Iran played a significant role in eliminating nuclear program experts and the military leadership of the Revolutionary Guard. However, Israel’s goals were mainly military and not directly related to overthrowing the current regime.
During the time of Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Israel and Iran had good relations for about 30 years. The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 was essentially a democratic revolution, aiming to expand people’s freedoms and establish a truly democratic state. Although Iran had achieved great material progress under the Shah, the brutality of the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK, and the lack of political freedom forced the people to rise up to achieve greater freedom and democracy. Unfortunately, as a result of the internal struggle between the various democratic forces and the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the leader of the revolution, the mullahs came to control all structures of power.
Supporters and Opponents of the Uprising
News coverage of Iran, as in the past, often focuses on large-scale demonstrations in the country’s largest cities. In doing so, Western media ignores the class composition of the competing demonstrations – the fact that the current Iranian regime received and receives support from a larger section of the population, namely the poor working class, peasants, artisans and public sector workers, while the majority of opposition protesters are upper- and middle-class students, business people and educated professionals.
Most of the coverage has come from English-speaking students active on social media in Tehran, ignoring the provinces, small and medium-sized towns and villages where the current theocratic regime has a broad base of support. The situation for the uprising is weakened by the fact that the educated urban youth and their supporters have social media as their weapon, but they are faced with a fanatical, Koran-educated and, on top of that, well-armed rural population, led by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The opposition supporters are usually students who can be easily mobilized for street action, while the Ebemmist group of working youth and domestic workers have expressed their views at the ballot box and have little time or desire to participate in street politics. The current administration has previously enjoyed broad support, for example, in oil and chemical-producing provinces, which may reflect the opposition of energy workers to reformist plans to privatize public companies. A large proportion of the current regime’s supporters probably believe that national security interests, the country’s unity, and the social security system, with all their shortcomings and excesses, could be better defended and improved with the current regime than with upper-class technocrats supported by Western-oriented, privileged youth who value individual lifestyles over community values and solidarity.
The main opponent of the uprising can be considered the IRGC, which consists of a motivated army, navy, and air force (approximately 125,000–190,000 personnel) and the Basij militia (300,000 active soldiers) that can mobilize up to about 600,000 volunteers. The IRGC’s power is built into Iran’s political, economic, and social framework, which gives it the durability and potential to guide the country’s future.
A significant factor in facilitating or resisting the uprising is the Artesh, formed from the pre-revolutionary army, which serves as Iran’s conventional defense force, tasked with protecting the country’s borders, seas, airspace, and territorial integrity. The number of personnel is estimated at 340,000–420,000. Historically, the army has been subordinate to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, receiving a smaller share of funding and modern weapons, and is often seen as less politically reliable.
Factors behind the uprising
According to some opinion polls, only 15% of the population supports the Islamic regime and its Sharia law, and about 70% of the population would like to break away from the current theocratic regime. If the figures are even remotely accurate, the conditions for an uprising would be very good. However, the problem is the fragmentation of the groups that want a change of power.
First of all, exiled political coalitions are pushing for a change of power, such as the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), led by Maryam Rajavi. It supports the overthrow of the regime and also has an internal network of “Resistance Units” that spread anti-regime communications. The NCRI includes the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), which the United States previously (until 2012) considered a terrorist group, and it carries out operations both abroad and secretly inside Iran.
Second are monarchist and nationalist groups such as the exiled son of the deposed Shah, Reza Pahlavi, who is pushing for a non-violent regime change. He has limited domestic support, and many inside Iran are skeptical of his close ties to Israel and the West. These groups also include the Constitutional Party of Iran and the House of Representatives of the Kingdom of Iran (Tondar), who want to restore the monarchy. Tondar has historically been reported to have used violent tactics.
Third are ethnic nationalist insurgents such as Khabat (Kurdish) and Jaish ul Adl (Baluchi), who are active in Iran’s border regions, carrying out attacks and pushing for autonomy.
The fourth group is secular and left-wing democratic groups such as the United Republicans of Iran, which promote democratic socialism and secular republicanism, or the “Neighborhood Youth Union” (United Youth of Iran), a grassroots movement that emerged during the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests. It organizes urban youth to challenge the clerical regime and demand human rights reforms.
The fifth group is independent activists and grassroots mobilizers who support democratic reforms and constitutional changes inside Iran, including by distributing leaflets, organizing strikes, and using secret messages to incite opposition.
The fragmentation of those opposing the current regime is evident between the exiled and domestic groups. There is a lack of unity and strategic organization. Domestic activists are wary of large-scale protests due to the regime’s brutal repression and the risks to civilians. Armed minority groups (Kurds, Baloch) escalate local resistance, but their goals often range from regime change to ethnic autonomy or separatism.
Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi as Leader of the Uprising?
In February 2025, various Iranian opposition factions elected Pahlavi as the leader of the opposition and the head of a future transitional government to “form the first national assembly and begin democratic rule through free elections.”
Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the Shah who was overthrown in Iran’s final 1979 Islamic Revolution, released a video message on June 17, 2025, in which he reiterated his call for regime change in Tehran, adding that the Islamic Republic of Iran was collapsing and that the time had come for the Iranian people to “retake Iran.” He said Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had “hid underground” and lost control of the country, describing the moment as “irreversible.” “The end of the Islamic Republic is the end of its 46-year war against the Iranian nation… Now is the time to rise up. Now all that is needed is a nationwide uprising to end this nightmare (…) I hope I will be with you soon.”
On his website, Pahlavi has said that the Iranian state should become democratic and secular, and that human rights should be respected. He would like to leave it to the Iranian people to decide whether the form of government is a constitutional monarchy or a republic.
The crown prince is hampered by the memory among older citizens of his Shah father, who, on his peacock throne, held power with the help of the SAVAK secret police torture gang, with the support of Britain and the CIA, and who overthrew the democratically elected government of Mohammed Mosaddegh in 1953, who wanted the Iranian people to benefit from Iran’s oil wealth instead of BP and other Western plunderers. This image may lead some Iranians to view the crown prince as a puppet ruler controlled by foreign powers.
Summary
The Iranian opposition is a diverse ecosystem: exiled political fronts, ethnic rebels, secular leftists, monarchists, and underground youth movements. While the current situation offers opportunities, fragmentation, fear of repression, and the lack of a unified internal leadership remain significant obstacles. To achieve meaningful change, grassroots unity—across ethnic, ideological, and strategic lines—is essential.
A group of Iranian businessmen, politicians, military figures, and senior clerics have begun to plan how to run Iran without Khamenei—whether he dies or is ousted. The plan includes a leadership committee that will take over the country and negotiate with the United States to extend the Israeli ceasefire.
From my point of view, a successful uprising requires the defection of every elite from the IRGC or the government, or especially from the military. The uprising also requires armed force, if necessary, from either the military or ethnic groups, because otherwise the fanatical and well-armed supporters of the current regime cannot be dislodged.
In my opinion, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi would be a good and credible unifying force for the scattered groups opposing the current theocratic regime in Iran. After the change of power, he could act as a transitional ruler until free elections are held in Iran and the elected representatives then decide on the future form of government, whether it is a constitutional monarchy or some other secular system.
Previously on the topic:
- Iran,Israel ja siviilit
- Iranilaisbloggarille turvapaikka Israelista
- Israel ja Iran lääketieteellisessä yhteishankkeessa
- Iranista Israeliin: L’Shanah Tovah
- Op-Ed: Israelin ja Iranin johdon kiistellessä ruohonjuuritaso käy dialogiin
- IRAN – revolution postponed
- Iran – Twitter – Revolution
- Iran – no Revolution but potential for Change anyway
- Saudi-Israeli cooperation for attacking Iran
- Israelilais-Iranilaisissa suhteissa muutakin kuin vihapuheita
This is the English version of an article that first appeared in the online publication Ariel-Israel in Finnish.
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