- a personal perspective on events in western Balkans and MENA. Topics of interest: Balkans, Israel, Serbia, EU enlargement,conflicts, crisis management. My Main Blog - Conflicts By Ari Rusila - with document library and link lists you may find from address http://arirusila.wordpress.com. My Ariel -website covers Israeli politics, defence and society in Finnish language in address - http://arielfi.wordpress.com
Israel’s small war cabinet met on Sunday evening [13/07/2025] with the aim of preventing the collapse of the Doha hostage and ceasefire talks. The key issue remains Hamas’s demand for Israel to withdraw from southern Gaza, the extent of the withdrawal and, in particular, whether the IDF can maintain the so-called Morag Corridor that bisects Gaza. After Israel has already accepted US Special Envoy Witkoff’s mediation proposal on several occasions, the talks remain stalled due to Hamas’ demands.
The other main topic of the meeting was Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz’s initiative to build a so-called “humanitarian city” in Rafah, southern Gaza. Katz had asked the Israeli military (IDF) to prepare a plan for the war cabinet meeting based on the initiative.
A tent camp housing displaced Palestinians in Rafah, southern Gaza, last year. Credit:Hatem Ali/Associated Press
A tent camp housing displaced Palestinians in Rafah, southern Gaza, last year. Credit:Hatem Ali/Associated Press
Humanitarian city?
The Israeli government says the “humanitarian city” will initially house 600,000 Palestinians currently living in tents in the overcrowded al-Mawas area on the southern Gaza Strip. Eventually, the entire population of more than two million people in the area will be relocated there.
Israeli media reports say construction could take more than a year and cost up to 15 billion shekels ($4.5 billion). Unnamed military officials said the project “would take three to five months from the start of construction until the humanitarian city is operational.”
Proponents of the “humanitarian city” plan argue that its establishment would be the first opportunity for an entity outside Hamas to take control of the area. Preliminary plans describe the camps as “large” and “voluntary” places where Gazans could “temporarily reside, deradicalize, re-integrate and prepare for relocation if they so wish.”
According to opponents of the plan, a “humanitarian city” would violate international law because civilians would be prevented from returning to their homes in the north, which would be a form of ethnic cleansing.
My analysis
The planned “humanitarian city” in Rafah has been subject to justified criticism – even descriptions of a concentration camp have been used – and there have been demands, among others, from Palestinians and international organizations for the right of Gazans to return to their homes. In my opinion, this criticism completely ignores the real situation and the time frame. Here are a few points of view that clarify this:
Firstly, Gaza is currently largely a war zone and I believe that every effort should be made to facilitate the evacuation of civilians from the combat zones.
Secondly, when the fighting sometimes ends with a ceasefire agreement and/or the withdrawal/elimination of Hamas in Gaza, a contributing factor is that most of Gaza is a ruined and uninhabitable demolition site, meaning that Gazans no longer have homes to return to.
Thirdly, making Gaza habitable requires clearance work, in which booby traps and explosives in the ruins are dismantled, and the tunnel weapons depots and tunnels are generally destroyed. This clearance work is estimated to last at least a year and even longer if bodies are searched for under the rubble. More time and impact will be required if the contaminated soil is replaced, for example to remove asbestos, a popular building material used in Gaza.
Fourthly, after the clearance work, new construction can begin and, if financing is arranged, it is estimated to last at least 10-15 years.
In light of the above situation, the “return home” of the Gazans, the Israeli religious far-right’s dream of a new settlement in Gaza, and Trump’s Riviera tourist destinations are not realistic for a decade or so. Instead, humanitarian aid – regardless of different visions of the future – was needed long ago and is now even more urgent.
I personally have considered the so-called Sinai option to be the best solution, where the Gazans and other Palestinians could establish their future-oriented autonomy/state, but at least so far Egypt has not agreed to provide “wasteland” for this purpose. I think that a “humanitarian city” offers the best emergency solution at this moment until better ones emerge. (About the Sinai option earlier, for example, in my analysis A Day After the Gaza War -Plan by Ariel Rusila )
“Final relief”
Finally, some trivia: Iranian authorities simulated a nuclear attack on Israel in the image they edited below, and most recently, religious scholars threatened destruction on both Israel and the United States during Friday prayers.
It is understandable that Israel takes Iran’s nuclear weapons program seriously with these dream images. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned President Trump during his recent visit to the United States that if Iran continues to develop nuclear weapons, Israel will respond with new military strikes.
This is the English version of an article that first appeared in the online publication Ariel-Israel in Finnish.
During and after the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, which is now in a ceasefire, Iranians have been encouraged to hold demonstrations against the current Iranian regime and in support of Israel not only in various parts of the Western world but also inside Iran – although in Iran they are small and life-threatening. At the same time, citizens in many places have openly opposed members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) when they remarked on women without headscarves. Abroad, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is trying to unite the now fragmented opposition that opposes the current Iranian regime.
The situation now raises hopes of a popular uprising and a change of power, and the opportunity for this is the best in decades. The success of the popular uprising is not at all self-evident, as the theocracy-supporting IRGC has taken major countermeasures, including mass arrests of representatives of Iran’s Jewish minority on charges of supporting Israel.
War as an enabler of the uprising
During the 12-day war, Iran launched nearly 600 missiles and over 1,000 drones at civilian population centers, killing about 30 civilians. For example, the attacks on May 23, 2025, killed more than 700 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), especially in the cities of Tehran and Karaj. This underscores the scale of the Israeli operation and its potentially devastating impact on Iran’s military leadership and infrastructure. Iran’s much-touted regional proxy network—Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis—largely refrained from joining the war. Hezbollah did not fire a single rocket, while the Houthis launched only two missiles in 12 days. Iran’s close backers—Russia and China—provided no assistance to the country. This isolation of Iran greatly strengthened Israel’s international legitimacy to carry out its attacks.
The war was effectively ended by a US bunker buster strike on Iran’s key underground facilities, Iran’s apparent response to it, and a ceasefire brokered by Qatar and the US, among others, between Israel and Iran.
The 12-day war significantly weakened Iran’s theocratic regime; in addition to the planners of the nuclear program, Israel eliminated a significant number of the IRGC’s top military leadership. At the same time, unconfirmed reports have emerged from inside Iran of a possible assassination of Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Mojtaba, widely known as a radical hardliner and likely successor to his aging father, was killed at close range in Tehran. If confirmed, this could send shockwaves through the Iranian leadership and deepen the crisis further.
As a small detail, Israel also directly attacked Iran’s Evin prison, a facility for political prisoners, blowing up its entrance.
Israel’s role
The good relations between Israel and Persia go back far into history, to the time of Cyrus the Great (c. 576–529 BCE); he allowed Jews expelled by the Babylonians to return to Israel and even financed the construction of the Temple in Jerusalem. Iran’s secularization is beneficial to Israel. This is not surprising, since Israel and Iran had excellent relations before the 1978-79 Islamic revolution. The Jewish community in Iran is the oldest continuously existing Jewish community in the world. The community is as significant in the diaspora as it is in Iran. Many now envision the so-called “Cyrus Accords,” i.e. a renewed friendship between Iranians and Israelis, similar to the already partially realized “Abraham Accords,” by which Israel has normalized its relations with several Muslim countries. In this way, Israel would, as it were, repay its debt from the time of Cyrus by freeing Iranians from the shackles of theocracy.
Israel’s unofficial goal has been to overthrow the current Iranian regime. Mossad was very active even before the war and, with the support of the Iranian state, even established a drone factory in Iran; during the war, these drones were used “at close range” to destroy Iran’s air defenses and other military infrastructure. Similarly, cells operating in Iran played a significant role in eliminating nuclear program experts and the military leadership of the Revolutionary Guard. However, Israel’s goals were mainly military and not directly related to overthrowing the current regime.
During the time of Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Israel and Iran had good relations for about 30 years. The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 was essentially a democratic revolution, aiming to expand people’s freedoms and establish a truly democratic state. Although Iran had achieved great material progress under the Shah, the brutality of the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK, and the lack of political freedom forced the people to rise up to achieve greater freedom and democracy. Unfortunately, as a result of the internal struggle between the various democratic forces and the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the leader of the revolution, the mullahs came to control all structures of power.
Supporters and Opponents of the Uprising
News coverage of Iran, as in the past, often focuses on large-scale demonstrations in the country’s largest cities. In doing so, Western media ignores the class composition of the competing demonstrations – the fact that the current Iranian regime received and receives support from a larger section of the population, namely the poor working class, peasants, artisans and public sector workers, while the majority of opposition protesters are upper- and middle-class students, business people and educated professionals.
Most of the coverage has come from English-speaking students active on social media in Tehran, ignoring the provinces, small and medium-sized towns and villages where the current theocratic regime has a broad base of support. The situation for the uprising is weakened by the fact that the educated urban youth and their supporters have social media as their weapon, but they are faced with a fanatical, Koran-educated and, on top of that, well-armed rural population, led by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The opposition supporters are usually students who can be easily mobilized for street action, while the Ebemmist group of working youth and domestic workers have expressed their views at the ballot box and have little time or desire to participate in street politics. The current administration has previously enjoyed broad support, for example, in oil and chemical-producing provinces, which may reflect the opposition of energy workers to reformist plans to privatize public companies. A large proportion of the current regime’s supporters probably believe that national security interests, the country’s unity, and the social security system, with all their shortcomings and excesses, could be better defended and improved with the current regime than with upper-class technocrats supported by Western-oriented, privileged youth who value individual lifestyles over community values and solidarity.
The main opponent of the uprising can be considered the IRGC, which consists of a motivated army, navy, and air force (approximately 125,000–190,000 personnel) and the Basij militia (300,000 active soldiers) that can mobilize up to about 600,000 volunteers. The IRGC’s power is built into Iran’s political, economic, and social framework, which gives it the durability and potential to guide the country’s future.
A significant factor in facilitating or resisting the uprising is the Artesh, formed from the pre-revolutionary army, which serves as Iran’s conventional defense force, tasked with protecting the country’s borders, seas, airspace, and territorial integrity. The number of personnel is estimated at 340,000–420,000. Historically, the army has been subordinate to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, receiving a smaller share of funding and modern weapons, and is often seen as less politically reliable.
Factors behind the uprising
According to some opinion polls, only 15% of the population supports the Islamic regime and its Sharia law, and about 70% of the population would like to break away from the current theocratic regime. If the figures are even remotely accurate, the conditions for an uprising would be very good. However, the problem is the fragmentation of the groups that want a change of power.
First of all, exiled political coalitions are pushing for a change of power, such as the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), led by Maryam Rajavi. It supports the overthrow of the regime and also has an internal network of “Resistance Units” that spread anti-regime communications. The NCRI includes the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), which the United States previously (until 2012) considered a terrorist group, and it carries out operations both abroad and secretly inside Iran.
Second are monarchist and nationalist groups such as the exiled son of the deposed Shah, Reza Pahlavi, who is pushing for a non-violent regime change. He has limited domestic support, and many inside Iran are skeptical of his close ties to Israel and the West. These groups also include the Constitutional Party of Iran and the House of Representatives of the Kingdom of Iran (Tondar), who want to restore the monarchy. Tondar has historically been reported to have used violent tactics.
Third are ethnic nationalist insurgents such as Khabat (Kurdish) and Jaish ul Adl (Baluchi), who are active in Iran’s border regions, carrying out attacks and pushing for autonomy.
The fourth group is secular and left-wing democratic groups such as the United Republicans of Iran, which promote democratic socialism and secular republicanism, or the “Neighborhood Youth Union” (United Youth of Iran), a grassroots movement that emerged during the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests. It organizes urban youth to challenge the clerical regime and demand human rights reforms.
The fifth group is independent activists and grassroots mobilizers who support democratic reforms and constitutional changes inside Iran, including by distributing leaflets, organizing strikes, and using secret messages to incite opposition.
The fragmentation of those opposing the current regime is evident between the exiled and domestic groups. There is a lack of unity and strategic organization. Domestic activists are wary of large-scale protests due to the regime’s brutal repression and the risks to civilians. Armed minority groups (Kurds, Baloch) escalate local resistance, but their goals often range from regime change to ethnic autonomy or separatism.
Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi as Leader of the Uprising?
In February 2025, various Iranian opposition factions elected Pahlavi as the leader of the opposition and the head of a future transitional government to “form the first national assembly and begin democratic rule through free elections.”
Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the Shah who was overthrown in Iran’s final 1979 Islamic Revolution, released a video message on June 17, 2025, in which he reiterated his call for regime change in Tehran, adding that the Islamic Republic of Iran was collapsing and that the time had come for the Iranian people to “retake Iran.” He said Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had “hid underground” and lost control of the country, describing the moment as “irreversible.” “The end of the Islamic Republic is the end of its 46-year war against the Iranian nation… Now is the time to rise up. Now all that is needed is a nationwide uprising to end this nightmare (…) I hope I will be with you soon.”
On his website, Pahlavi has said that the Iranian state should become democratic and secular, and that human rights should be respected. He would like to leave it to the Iranian people to decide whether the form of government is a constitutional monarchy or a republic.
The crown prince is hampered by the memory among older citizens of his Shah father, who, on his peacock throne, held power with the help of the SAVAK secret police torture gang, with the support of Britain and the CIA, and who overthrew the democratically elected government of Mohammed Mosaddegh in 1953, who wanted the Iranian people to benefit from Iran’s oil wealth instead of BP and other Western plunderers. This image may lead some Iranians to view the crown prince as a puppet ruler controlled by foreign powers.
Summary
The Iranian opposition is a diverse ecosystem: exiled political fronts, ethnic rebels, secular leftists, monarchists, and underground youth movements. While the current situation offers opportunities, fragmentation, fear of repression, and the lack of a unified internal leadership remain significant obstacles. To achieve meaningful change, grassroots unity—across ethnic, ideological, and strategic lines—is essential.
A group of Iranian businessmen, politicians, military figures, and senior clerics have begun to plan how to run Iran without Khamenei—whether he dies or is ousted. The plan includes a leadership committee that will take over the country and negotiate with the United States to extend the Israeli ceasefire.
From my point of view, a successful uprising requires the defection of every elite from the IRGC or the government, or especially from the military. The uprising also requires armed force, if necessary, from either the military or ethnic groups, because otherwise the fanatical and well-armed supporters of the current regime cannot be dislodged.
In my opinion, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi would be a good and credible unifying force for the scattered groups opposing the current theocratic regime in Iran. After the change of power, he could act as a transitional ruler until free elections are held in Iran and the elected representatives then decide on the future form of government, whether it is a constitutional monarchy or some other secular system.
President Donald Trump on Saturday (June 21, 25) announced a “very successful strike” on three of Iran’s nuclear weapons sites, including Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan. In my article about the Israel-Iran war and how it will end less than a week ago, I presented another scenario
The destruction of the US nuclear weapons program, or to borrow a strategy, its bombers will respond by carrying the heaviest bunker busters from their facilities, such as Fordow, nearly a hundred meters underground.
This scenario now appears to have come true.
Earlier in May 2025, the IAEA estimated that more than 400 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride gas had already been enriched to 60 percent – a level that is considered highly enriched. This material is under international control and is enough for about 10 nuclear weapons.
Trump has publicly criticized his national intelligence chief Tulsi Gabbard and said she was wrong when she claimed that there was no evidence that Iran was building a nuclear weapon. Israel has claimed that Iran is capable of producing a nuclear warhead.
The Iranian foreign minister toured the world last week, meeting with EU leaders, among others, to convince them that Iran may have a nuclear weapons program. It would be sensible for him to convey the message that the program in question will be terminated unconditionally. This would have taken a couple of days for the B2 bombers that left Missouri to refuel, which is why they were not sent without full fuel tanks on board due to the payload (=MOB bunker busters). Well, now the negotiations are continuing because Iran does not (anymore) have a nuclear weapons program.
Two days ago, Trump gave about two weeks to get a result from the negotiations on the war between Israel and Iran. Now Trump seems to be implementing the same negotiation strategy as in the first term by recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and thus removing it from the negotiation agenda. Now Iran’s nuclear program has apparently been removed from the agenda, now it is necessary to take care of ending the external war between Israel and Iran and ending Iran’s support for the Houthis. Overly optimistic, negotiations on the human rights of Iran or the rights of Kurdistan will be expected, at least the EU did not have the space to be too careless. Trump said – after the Iranian attack – “now is the time for peace”.
Iran has responded with massive missile and drone strikes to Israel’s preemptive airstrike on nuclear facilities and military targets on Friday, June 13, 2025, supported by smaller-scale operations inside Iran by the Mossad. Israel’s initial strike caused severe damage to the Natanz and Isfahan nuclear facilities and crippled numerous defense systems and ballistic missile production facilities.
Israel’s stated goals are, first, to destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons program and, second, to stop the country’s missile program. An unofficial indirect goal, I assume, is to change Iran’s theocratic regime.
There are no signs yet of regime change in Iran, although on the other hand, there have been demonstrations in Iran and abroad supporting Israel’s strikes. Inside Iran, the current government is based on the religious population of the countryside and the Revolutionary Guard. The civilized, secular, young and unarmed population of the cities is too powerless to make a change; the situation may change in the future if Iran’s ethnic groups on the periphery – such as the Kurds – begin to demand greater autonomy after the Revolutionary Guard’s power has been sufficiently weakened.
Attacks on Israel’s home front reinforce the urgency of Israel’s campaign to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. Any of the hundreds of ballistic missiles launched at Israel could have been equipped with nuclear warheads if Iran had been allowed to achieve its goal.
As things stand, Israel will not achieve its first goal. Although several nuclear facilities [Natanz and Parchin being the most important] have already been largely destroyed, the most significant of them, the Fordow facility, located about 80 meters below sea level, has not yet been significantly damaged.
The second goal seems to be being met. Iran still possesses thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles, so at the current intensity of the war it can carry out attacks on Israel for a couple of weeks, while Israel can do this for even longer with its air superiority and capacity. It is also possible that Iran will quickly manufacture a so-called dirty bomb from the radioactive material it possesses, which could be used by cells operating in the West.
Against the background presented above, I see three alternative scenarios for the end of the war:
1) Israel destroys Iran’s nuclear weapons program using its tactical nuclear weapons,
2) The US destroys Iran’s nuclear weapons program using or lending its strategic bombers capable of carrying the heaviest bunker busters with which, for example, the Fordow facility, which is almost a hundred meters underground, can be destroyed.
3) Iran is ready to give up its nuclear weapons program in the nuclear negotiations and guarantee international inspectors full and free access to its country to verify the promised abandonment.
My own assessment is that the US will use any aid it may give to Israel as leverage to persuade Iran to sign an agreement to ensure the destruction of its nuclear weapons program.
Student-led protests in Serbia reached their peak this weekend [March 15-16, 2025] when more than 100,000 anti-government protesters gathered in Belgrade to demand the resignation of President Vucic. At the same time also some students and former paramilitary fighters loyal to President Vucic have been camping outside the presidency building in Belgrade from March 13, 2025 fueling fears of violent incidents during antigovernment rally this weekend. This could be a provocation by the government to order police to quell the growing anti-government movement.
A sticker with a message reading, “15.03. See you in Belgrade,” is seen on a tractor parked near the Serbian presidency building and the National Assembly in Belgrade. Credit: [Andrej Isakovic/AFP]
The protests were sparked by the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad on November 1, killing 15 people (Background on this in my article -in Finnish- Serbiassa asemakatos romahti – 14 kuoli ). The station had been recently renovated under opaque infrastructure contracts – mainly including companies from Serbia and China, but reportedly also from France and Hungary – awarded under a credit agreement with China.
Serbian anticorruption protesters, riot police and supporters of President Aleksandar Vucic have faced off – so far -without major incident in central Belgrade as people gathered for the biggest antigovernment rally in years. At least 107,000 people from across Serbia have joined on Saturday 15 an anti-corruption rally in Belgrade, in what is regarded as the culmination of months of protest that have shaken the grip of the country’s autocratic president, Aleksandar Vučić, the interior minister reported.
Agence France-Presse reported that known ultranationalists, including members of a former militia linked to the assassination of then prime minister, Zoran Djindjic in 2003, have been seen among the group of activists camped near the presidential palace. Djindjic, who led street protests that deposed Slobodan Milošević in 2000, was assassinated 22 years ago this week by a paramilitary police group known by its unofficial name, the Red Berets. According Dragan Djilas, the leader of the opposition Freedom and Justice party, Vučić “has mobilised criminals, thugs and Red Beret members, bringing people from Kosovo and stationing them in Pionirski Park, knowing hundreds of thousands will gather there on Saturday”.
Near-daily student protests began in December, 2024, after the deaths of 15 people when a roof at a railway station collapsed on November 1 in the northern city of Novi Sad, which critics blame on corruption under Vucic. Sporadic clashes occurred overnight before Saturday’s rally, in front of the National Assembly, from which protesters were to march to Slavija Square. Police deployed hundreds of officers in full riot gear in and around Pionirski Park and across the street.Thousands of veterans from elite military brigades in maroon berets and bikers who support the students also stood for 15 minutes of silence beginning at 11:52am (10:52 GMT) to honour the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy at the time of the roof collapse.
A prelude: The overthrow of Milošević
Yugoslav and former Serbian President Slobodan Milošević was cracking down on opposition, non-government organisations and independent media. From 1991 onwards there were campaigns of civil resistance against his administration that were to culminate in the largely non-violent revolution of October 2000. In 1998, a dozen students met to form Otpor! ( “resistance”). Analysing the mistakes of the 1996–97 protests, they realised they needed more effective organisation, strategy, planning, recruiting, and everything necessary for a sustained fight. Galvanised by outrage over new laws that imposed political control of their universities and harassment of independent media, the Otpor! students called for the removal of Milošević and the establishment of democracy and the rule of law.
To unify opposition, eighteen parties in Serbia formed the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition, with Vojislav Koštunica as the candidate to confront Milošević. The vote took place on 24 September 2000. The DOS coalition reported that Vojislav Koštunica won over half of the votes, enough to defeat Milošević in a single round. The government-controlled Federal Electoral Committee claimed that no candidate won over 50% of the votes and that a second round between Koštunica and Milošević would take place. Some obvious irregularities could be found in the Federal Electoral Committee official results.
The protests initially started with strikers at the Kolubara mines on 29 September, which produced most of Serbia’s electricity. The protest reached its height on 5 October 2000. Several hundred thousand protesters from all over Serbia arrived in Belgrade to protest. The key symbol of the campaign was the slogan Gotov je! ( meaning “He is finished!”), created by Otpor!. Unlike previous protests, there was no large scale police crackdown.
For a year leading up to the elections, the United States-funded consultants played a crucial role in the anti-Milošević campaign. The International Republican Institute trained 400 activists outside the country, who returned to Serbia and trained another 15,000 people to observe polling stations inside the country. Each observer’s participation was paid at $5 – money provided by the West (in 2000, the average monthly salary in the country was $30). Other Western organizations to support Otpor! were e.g. the Open Society Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy and Freedom House. Otpor! activists honed the lessons of nonviolent resistance developed by American scholar Gene Sharp and retired U.S. Army Colonel Robert Helvey. Most Serbs did not realize that the U.S. was directing the opposition’s electoral strategy and funding the creation and distribution of campaign materials.
Second act: From Otpor! To Color revolutions and Arab Spring
After the overthrow of Milošević Student-dominated youth movements have played a central role in the “color revolutions” seen in post-communist societies in recent years. Otpor! has inspired other youth movements in Eastern Europe, such as Kmara in Georgia, which played an important role in the Rose Revolution, and PORA in Ukraine, which was key in organising the demonstrations that led to the Orange Revolution. Like Otpor, these organisations have consequently practiced non-violent resistance in opposing authoritarian leaders. Similar movements include KelKel in Kyrgyzstan, Zubr in Belarus and MJAFT! in Albania. Serbia’s opposition organisation Otpor! has been involved in training students in civil disobedience in Georgia as well in over 20 other countries.
The uprisings witnessed throughout the Middle East have lent new credence to the power of youth movements and nonviolent resistance in authoritarian settings; youth activities from Egypt to Algeria have benefited from the lessons of their contemporaries in post-Communist Europe. Otpor! activists not only inspired, but shared insights with aspiring Egyptian revolutionaries in the years preceding the February 2011 changes..
There is evidence that Egyptian groups such as Kefaya, the April 6 Youth Movement, and Youth for Change built upon and adapted revolutionary models employed by young activists in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Adhering to the tenants of nonviolent resistance, their strategies and tactics evoked those so successfully employed by youth movements such as Otpor! in the run-up to the “color revolutions” of the early 2000s.
Act Three: From Vučić to Real Time
Aleksandar Vučić, who had previously been a member of Milošević’s Serbian Radical Party, founded the more moderate and pro-EU Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in 2008 with Tomislav Nikolić. In 2012, Nikolić won the presidential election and was replaced by Aleksandar Vučić as party leader. The Progressive Party won a landslide victory in the elections in 2014, and Vučić was elected Prime Minister and in 2017 Vucic was elected president. The line of Prime Minister and then president Vučić’s populist government became increasingly authoritarian and restrictive of media freedom. Vučić also selects the t prime minister of Serbia and in practice holds the highest political power in his hands.
During Vučić rule Serbia has suffered from democratic backsliding into authoritarianism, followed by a decline in media freedom and civil liberties. Opposition figures accused the SNS of using public resources for political purposes and election monitor CRTA complained before the vote of a “chronic lack of pluralism” in Serbia. Recently government policy is characterised as one of human rights violations, restrictions on freedom of expression and campaigns of harassment against the opposition figures, journalists and media outlets. Today the largest political parties in the National Assembly are the populist Serbian Progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia, that with its partners, hold more than a supermajority number of seats.
President Aleksandar Vucic claimed a re-election victory in the country’s snap December 2023 elections, with his SNS, winning some 47% of the vote. Opposition parties under the Serbia Against Violence (SPN) banner were well behind with around 23%. The vote was almost immediately marred by accusations of irregularities. The International Election Observation Mission said in a statement that “serious irregularities, including vote-buying and ballot box stuffing were observed”.
Milos Vucevic, the leader of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party became prime minister in May 2024 and he resigned in January 2025 amid student-led anti-corruption protests following the November 2024 collapse of roof of a railway station in Novi Sad on 1 November, which killed 15 people. Vučić, widely seen to have sacrificed his prime minister to protect his position, has ruled out forming a transitional government and holding elections in six months. Echoing Russian narratives, he has described the protests as a western-orchestrated ploy to oust him from power and destroy Serbia.
Epilogue: My conclusions
The current protests in Serbia, if successful, could lead to the ouster of the country’s current president, especially if the student movement receives direct support from the broad middle class. What is essential for me to see is whether the situation will get worse, better, or remain the same without Vučić.
I would personally describe an Otpor!-type strategy as an anarchist but well-organized, military but non-violent method of organizing mass demonstrations, coups, or even revolutions. Post-coup governance is another matter entirely.
In the years that followed overthrow of Slobodan Milošević Serbia underwent a protracted transition that included the assassination of a reformist prime minister, the resurgence of the far-right Serbian Radical Party and a legacy of corruption and nepotism that continues to pervade its politics. Otpor! disbanded soon after Milošević’s departure. An intensely heterogeneous movement comprised of leftists and conservatives, monarchists and republicans, nationalists and cosmopolitans, Otpor! lost the glue that bound it together, Otpor! members could not agree on how to proceed.
The overthrow of Milosevic eventually led to the current situation, the Arab Spring, initiated by a liberal student movement, led to the rise of the conservative Muslim Brotherhood and then the military in Egypt. Iran’s “green movement” shrank when the government restricted the use of social media and the internet by urban youth, and when the uneducated rural population rushed to support the government.
Even in traditional constitutional states, mass demonstrations do not necessarily lead to results. For example, in Israel, I have participated in massive demonstrations in Tel Aviv several times before and during the current war. Despite legitimate demands and demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of citizens every weekend for a couple of years, and despite the fact that, according to opinion polls, about 70% of the citizens support the demands of the demonstrators, power in Israel will not change until the current government loses its slim majority in the Knesset, either through internal factors or elections.
Lessons learned: Movements that are defined solely on the basis of a dictator’s ousting have little merit once that dictator is gone. Moreover, movements that fail to identify themselves in positive terms—as for something beyond the abstraction of “democracy,” rather than simply against a sitting regime—are unlikely to withstand the tests of time.
The first phase of the three-phase hostage and ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas ends on Saturday, March 1, 2025. Under the agreement, 602 terrorist prisoners will then be released in exchange for the bodies of four slain Israeli hostages. Of the prisoners to be released, 50 are serving life sentences, many of whom were responsible for orchestrating the horrific suicide bombings of the mid-1990s.
Saturday’s exchange of hostages for terrorists marks the end of the first phase of the agreement. There are no signs from either side of the warring parties or the various mediators that Israel and Hamas are close to reaching an agreement on implementing the second phase of the hostage and ceasefire agreement.
Saturday, March 1, 2025~~?
US Ambassador Steve Witkoff has been trying to broker an extension of the first phase of the ceasefire. Such an extension would specifically include the release of hostages deemed to be in need of immediate medical attention. The remaining hostages are all men under 50, and each would require Israel to pay higher “ransoms” than convicted terrorists to be released. It is unlikely that an extension of the first phase would cover all living hostages, as Hamas can be expected to want to hold some to achieve its larger political goals in the war.
The hardening of attitudes in Israel is also illustrated by the announcement on Thursday, February 27, 2025, by Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen that Israel will not withdraw from the so-called Philadelphia Corridor in Gaza as required by the ceasefire agreement. He stated that Israeli forces would not withdraw until three key goals were achieved: the full return of prisoners, the removal of Hamas from power, and the complete disarmament of Gaza. Israeli forces also consider their presence in the area essential to prevent weapons smuggling. Israel was expected to begin withdrawing from the Philadelphia Corridor on Saturday, the last day of the first phase of the ceasefire, and to complete the withdrawal within eight days.
Israeli politicians outside the government have presented their own “after-the-day” plans for Gaza. Left-wing leader Yair Golan called for moderate Palestinian forces to control Gaza while preserving the IDF’s freedom of action.
Yair Lapid, the leader of the center-right opposition, presented a plan that called for Egypt to take responsibility for Gaza for 15 years, during which the international community would wipe out Egypt’s $155 billion foreign debt. Lapid explained that Israel cannot accept Hamas remaining in power, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is unable to govern Gaza, the Israeli occupation is undesirable, and the continued chaos poses a serious security threat to Israel. At the same time, Egypt’s economy is on the verge of collapse and threatens the stability of Egypt and the entire Middle East. Lapid said that over the course of 15 years, Gaza would be rebuilt and the conditions for self-rule would be created.
Lapid proposed that the current ceasefire be ended until all hostages are released, with Egypt assuming control of Gaza through a UN Security Council resolution, defined as “custodianship,” with the goal of transferring the Gaza Strip to the PA government after a process of reform and deradicalization, with measurable criteria. At the same time, a reconstruction process would begin under Egyptian supervision, with Saudi Arabia and the Abraham Accords signatories participating in working groups, and the United States investing in Gaza. He also called on Egypt to allow any Gazan who wants to leave and has somewhere to go to do so in a regulated manner.
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is currently (27/02/2025) in Riyadh to discuss an Arab plan for Gaza. Arab states are expected to discuss a post-war reconstruction plan for Gaza, possibly to counter US President Donald Trump’s proposal to redevelop the Strip under US control. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are reviewing the Arab plan in Riyadh before it is presented at a planned Arab summit in Cairo on March 4. The plan for Gaza could include up to $20 billion for reconstruction in the territory. The proposal includes the formation of a Palestinian national committee to govern Gaza without Hamas involvement and international participation in reconstruction without transferring Palestinians abroad. Egypt’s initial proposal is reported to have been a five-year plan for Gaza reconstruction, during which Gazans would be resettled in safe zones inside Gaza.
The EU, a major donor to the Palestinians, presented its position to the Israeli authorities in talks in Brussels on 24 February as part of the EU-Israel Association Council, the first such meeting since 2022. The EU supports the return of Gazans to their homes in Gaza and has pledged to contribute to their reconstruction.
According to Maher al-Namoura, a Fatah spokesman, the Palestinian Authority is capable of governing and rebuilding Gaza. He made his remarks in a recent discussion on the social media of Saudi Arabia’s interactive news channel Al Hadath. This reflects the PA’s policy since 2007 – when Hamas illegally pushed it out of Gaza in 2007 – that it should govern Gaza. Fatah is the largest faction in the PA.
My assessment
My assessment of the implementation of the second phase of the Hamas-Israel agreement, at least in the form previously outlined, is even more pessimistic than before. The reason is the numerous violations of the first agreement and the treatment of the hostages, which shocked the Israelis in particular. Tensions are also increasing due to the bus bombing in the Tel Aviv area a week ago, which, if successful (only two buses exploded at the depot), would have been very devastating. The attack was carried out by West Bank terrorists but Hamas took responsibility for them.
The first shock was the starving appearance of the three released hostages, the second was the inferior carnivalization of the release event by Hamas, the third was the return of the mother, baby and child under 5 years old of the Bibas family in coffins, the fourth was that one body was a completely unknown Arab woman (later corrected to the right person) and the fifth was when it was discovered that a 9-month-old baby and a 4-year-old had been slaughtered by Hamas already in November 2023 (Hamashan claimed that the family died in Israeli airstrikes, so no signs were found in the autopsies).
If no agreement is reached to extend the first phase, Israel is preparing to resume intense fighting with US support. It is hoped that the credibility of this threat will persuade Hamas to extend the agreement.
In the second phase of the ceasefire, the remaining 59 hostages would be released, Israel would withdraw completely from Gaza, and a permanent ceasefire would be established. Of the hostages, 24-27 are believed to still be alive. The current Israeli government does not want to withdraw from Gaza until all hostages are returned, and as long as Hamas poses a military threat to the country,
A renewed outbreak of fighting, should the ceasefire collapse, will occur in a vastly different global strategic environment than the one that prevailed when the war broke out in October 2023. The Iranian “ring of fire” that surrounded Israel in 2023 has broken in Lebanon and Syria (but not in Yemen), while the US administration today no longer places limits on Israeli firepower.
In any case, I assume that in the coming weeks there will be intensive negotiations on extending the first phase of the agreement. During this time, Israel will probably conclude the purge of Hamas terrorist cells in the West Bank, and the moderate Arab countries will present their own post-war plan for Gaza.
US President Donald Trump’s vision for Gaza has been met with a largely negative reception around the world. The initiative has been described as outrageous, illegal, ethnic cleansing, a violation of international order, forced displacement, impossible to implement, dramatic, shocking, etc. On the other hand, it has been described as “out of the box” thinking, a panacea, a masterstroke, radical, unconventional, etc.
From my perspective, Trump’s vision is a game changer, the cards have now been redistributed, disregarding the traditional rules, resulting in a pragmatic plan that promises a better future and is feasible due to the presenter.
Trump’s vision
President Trump presented his Gaza vision a little over two weeks ago and has since returned to it on two occasions, also presenting clarifications. The main features of the Trump plan’s control elements:
After the end of the Gaza war, Israel will hand over the Gaza Strip to US control in terms of Gaza and Hamas; US soldiers would not be needed in Gaza.
The United States will “clean up the demolition site”, remove the booby traps and mines laid by Hamas, as well as unexploded ordnance, of which there are estimated to be around 30,000 in Gaza.
The cleanup and The reconstruction of the areas in question, either selectively or by transferring Gazans elsewhere, either to the Gaza security zones or to areas or countries primarily allocated to Egypt and Jordan, has a “humanitarian heart” for “shorter or longer periods of time”.
Under one leadership and with international funding, Gaza will be rebuilt as the “Riviera of the Middle East”.
In addition to the Gaza vision, Trump has announced that he will issue a statement in March 2025 recognizing Israeli sovereignty in Judea and Samaria. If this happens, it will inspire a force to implement reactions and change the dynamics of the regional conflict.
A game move?
Trump’s vision has shocked the Middle East, his opponents and his domestic allies. The question has not been answered by a tweet but by an idea that he has already presented three times, most recently at an official press conference on February 4, 2024. Thus, and since the world’s most influential political leader is involved, the proposal should be taken very seriously. Since it also concerns Donald Trump, there will also be different perspectives on this.
Firstly, it may partly be a domestic political tactic with a wild idea to divert journalists and the public from other, perhaps more prosaic, disputes.
Secondly, it may be a negotiation opening to maximize, in order to finally force the other parties involved, after decades of fruitless negotiations, condemnatory high-flying resolutions and general inquisitorial efforts, to take a position on a concrete model that can also be implemented without the participation of the other parties involved.
Thirdly, it may be a so-called“mad man’s”tactic – which has been used by, for example, President Putin – when the absence of a presenter creates uncertainty among the interlocutors about this real solution.
Israel Already Acting on Trump’s Vision
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz on Thursday ordered the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to prepare a plan “to allow the voluntary departure of Gaza residents”… “I am preparing President Trump for a bold initiative that would allow a large portion of the Gaza population to move under a different agreement,” according to a Defense Ministry statement. Katz said Trump’s plan “will take several years, during which time Palestinians will be integrated into host countries while facilitating long-term reconstruction efforts in a demilitarized and [neighboring] Gaza free of threats in the post-Hamas era.”
According to Katz, countries such as Spain, Ireland and Norway, which have all accused Israel of violating international law during its war in Gaza, would be “legally obligated to accept any Gazans who arrange to enter their territory.”
Gazans’ willingness to leave
According to the propaganda of Palestinian figures and al-Jazeera (Hamas), Gazans do not want to leave anywhere. However, in addition to the elite who have left, there is also a desire to leave among ordinary Gazans.
In 2015, Fatah personnel claimed that over 90 percent of Gazans wanted to leave because of the Hamas regime. Recent surveys show that there is a reason for the desire to leave among Gazans. According to a 2023 survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Research (PSR) (conducted from September 28 to October 8, 2023), 31% of Gazans expressed a desire to emigrate from abroad, and nearly half (44%) of 18-29 year-olds were considering emigrating. The most desired destination was Turkey, followed by Germany, Canada, the United States and Qatar.
Poll info from Palestinian pollster@KShikakiPoll info from Palestinian pollster@KShikakiPoll info from Palestinian pollster@KShikaki
Dr. Mohimer Abu-Saada, a political scientist who left Gaza during the war and now lives with his family in Cairo, said: “Gaza is now a place where you can only leave. Most of the residents of the strip have become refugees, and there is no infrastructure in Gaza.”
“Before October 7, fleeing Gaza was the most popular dream for Palestinians. The atmosphere, especially among the youth, was one of complete despair, and this may have been one of the reasons why Hamas started the war – to save itself from civil unrest,” said S., a Gazan media figure who fled to Egypt with his family during the war, according to Ynetnews.
According to UN sources, around 133,000 people, about 7% of Gaza’s population, left between 7 October 2023 and 6 May 2024, when the IDF took control of the Rafah crossing. Before the IDF took control of the crossing, a smuggling industry flourished in Rafah, with wealthier Gazans bribed their way into Egypt. After that, movement across the Gaza-Egypt border for Gazans virtually stopped. Before this, the price of a permit ranged from $6,000 to $12,000 per person, allowing the wealthy to establish a community of around 100,000 Gazans in Cairo and join the tens of thousands who lived in the city before the war.
According to the Palestinian Authority, 860,000 people have left Gaza since Hamas took control in 2007. Evidence of this trend was seen last September, a month before the war, when chaos erupted in Gaza as thousands of Gazans crowded into the “Passi” travel agency, which issued visas to Turkey. The 18,000 permits issued were barely enough to meet the enormous demand.
My assessment
I personally welcome Trump’s vision for two reasons. First, it completely re-arranges the geopolitical playing field, at least in the Middle East, by bringing a concrete, viable proposition to the table instead of aimless whining. Second, the proposal, at its best, could implement what I consider to be the most pragmatic Middle East peace-loving Sinai and Jordanian options for the long-term establishment of a Palestinian state or Palestinian autonomy while meeting Israel’s security needs.
Currently, almost everyone other than the White House and Israel (according to opinion polls, 82 percent of Israeli Jews support “encouraging immigration” of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip) opposes Trump’s vision, especially when it comes to “population transfer.” For example, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas has suggested that some Gazans be relocated to the West Bank on condition that a new Palestinian city be built for them. The area west of Jericho has been identified as a possible location for this development.
According to the UN, direct infrastructure damage is $18.5 billion, and the cost of clearing the rubble alone is estimated at $1.2 billion. The total cost of rebuilding Gaza is estimated at $40 billion, and could extend to 2040 or beyond. Trump’s previous “deal of the century” includes, among other things, the reconstruction of Gaza, the construction of an airport and a designated port in El Arish, and a large industrial park in Sinai. Trump’s latest proposal – apart from the refugee resettlement – is seen in Egypt as a sign that the US president is committed to rebuilding Gaza. (Deal of the Century Finally Announced! [Op-Ed])
Understandably, both Egypt and Jordan have serious security concerns about millions of Palestinians being resettled in their territories. These concerns can be overcome by defining for the Palestinians their own demarcated and controlled areas where new camps or cities are located. After a de-radicalization program and the development of social structures, these areas could then, if they so wish, become independent or, for example, form a confederation with host states.
As Trump’s vision is implemented, well-meaning Palestinian advocates may have to consider whether they want to keep people trapped in a devastated enclave for perhaps a decade simply to avoid accusations of ethnic cleansing.
Palestinians return home to Gaza City on February 2, 2025. Approximately 90% of Gaza residents were displaced during the Israel-Hamas war, according to the UN. Credit: Ali Jadallah/Anadolu/Getty Images
