Sunday, March 16, 2025

Serbia – Overthrow of the President Is the Easy Part


March 16, 2025


Student-led protests in Serbia reached their peak this weekend [March 15-16, 2025] when more than 100,000 anti-government protesters gathered in Belgrade to demand the resignation of President Vucic. At the same time also some students and former paramilitary fighters loyal to President Vucic have been camping outside the presidency building in Belgrade from March 13, 2025 fueling fears of violent incidents during antigovernment rally this weekend. This could be
a provocation by the government to order police to quell the growing anti-government movement.

A sticker with a message reading, “15.03. See you in Belgrade,” is seen on a tractor parked near the Serbian presidency building and the National Assembly in Belgrade. Credit:  [Andrej Isakovic/AFP]

The protests were sparked by the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad on November 1, killing 15 people (Background on this in my article -in Finnish- Serbiassa asemakatos romahti – 14 kuoli ). The station had been recently renovated under opaque infrastructure contracts – mainly including companies from Serbia and China, but reportedly also from France and Hungary – awarded under a credit agreement with China.

Serbian anticorruption protesters, riot police and supporters of President Aleksandar Vucic have faced off – so far -without major incident in central Belgrade as people gathered for the biggest antigovernment rally in years. At least 107,000 people from across Serbia have joined on Saturday 15 an anti-corruption rally in Belgrade, in what is regarded as the culmination of months of protest that have shaken the grip of the country’s autocratic president, Aleksandar Vučić, the interior minister reported.

Agence France-Presse reported that known ultranationalists, including members of a former militia linked to the assassination of then prime minister, Zoran Djindjic in 2003, have been seen among the group of activists camped near the presidential palace. Djindjic, who led street protests that deposed Slobodan Milošević in 2000, was assassinated 22 years ago this week by a paramilitary police group known by its unofficial name, the Red Berets. According Dragan Djilas, the leader of the opposition Freedom and Justice party, Vučić “has mobilised criminals, thugs and Red Beret members, bringing people from Kosovo and stationing them in Pionirski Park, knowing hundreds of thousands will gather there on Saturday”.

Near-daily student protests began in December, 2024, after the deaths of 15 people when a roof at a railway station collapsed on November 1 in the northern city of Novi Sad, which critics blame on corruption under Vucic. Sporadic clashes occurred overnight before Saturday’s rally, in front of the National Assembly, from which protesters were to march to Slavija Square. Police deployed hundreds of officers in full riot gear in and around Pionirski Park and across the street.Thousands of veterans from elite military brigades in maroon berets and bikers who support the students also stood for 15 minutes of silence beginning at 11:52am (10:52 GMT) to honour the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy at the time of the roof collapse.

A prelude: The overthrow of Milošević

Yugoslav and former Serbian President Slobodan Milošević was cracking down on opposition, non-government organisations and independent media. From 1991 onwards there were campaigns of civil resistance against his administration that were to culminate in the largely non-violent revolution of October 2000. In 1998, a dozen students met to form Otpor! ( “resistance”). Analysing the mistakes of the 1996–97 protests, they realised they needed more effective organisation, strategy, planning, recruiting, and everything necessary for a sustained fight. Galvanised by outrage over new laws that imposed political control of their universities and harassment of independent media, the Otpor! students called for the removal of Milošević and the establishment of democracy and the rule of law. 

To unify opposition, eighteen parties in Serbia formed the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition, with Vojislav Koštunica as the candidate to confront Milošević. The vote took place on 24 September 2000. The DOS coalition reported that Vojislav Koštunica won over half of the votes, enough to defeat Milošević in a single round. The government-controlled Federal Electoral Committee claimed that no candidate won over 50% of the votes and that a second round between Koštunica and Milošević would take place. Some obvious irregularities could be found in the Federal Electoral Committee official results.

The protests initially started with strikers at the Kolubara mines on 29 September, which produced most of Serbia’s electricity. The protest reached its height on 5 October 2000. Several hundred thousand protesters from all over Serbia arrived in Belgrade to protest.  The key symbol of the campaign was the slogan Gotov je! ( meaning “He is finished!”), created by Otpor!. Unlike previous protests, there was no large scale police crackdown.

For a year leading up to the elections, the United States-funded consultants played a crucial role in the anti-Milošević campaign. The International Republican Institute trained 400 activists outside the country, who returned to Serbia and trained another 15,000 people to observe polling stations inside the country.  Each observer’s participation was paid at $5 – money provided by the West (in 2000, the average monthly salary in the country was $30). Other Western organizations to support Otpor! were e.g. the Open Society Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy and Freedom House. Otpor! activists honed the lessons of nonviolent resistance developed by American scholar Gene Sharp and retired U.S. Army Colonel Robert Helvey. Most Serbs did not realize that the U.S. was directing the opposition’s electoral strategy and funding the creation and distribution of campaign materials.

Second act: From Otpor! To Color revolutions and Arab Spring

After the overthrow of Milošević Student-dominated youth movements have played a central role in the “color revolutions” seen in post-communist societies in recent years.  Otpor! has inspired other youth movements in Eastern Europe, such as Kmara in Georgia, which played an important role in the Rose Revolution, and PORA in Ukraine, which was key in organising the demonstrations that led to the Orange Revolution. Like Otpor, these organisations have consequently practiced non-violent resistance in opposing authoritarian leaders. Similar movements include KelKel in Kyrgyzstan, Zubr in Belarus and MJAFT! in Albania. Serbia’s opposition organisation Otpor! has been involved in training students in civil disobedience in Georgia as well in over 20 other countries.

The uprisings witnessed throughout the Middle East have lent new credence to the power of youth movements and nonviolent resistance in authoritarian settings; youth activities from Egypt to Algeria have benefited from the lessons of their contemporaries in post-Communist Europe. Otpor! activists not only inspired, but shared insights with aspiring Egyptian revolutionaries in the years preceding the February 2011 changes..

There is evidence that Egyptian groups such as Kefaya, the April 6 Youth Movement, and Youth for Change built upon and adapted revolutionary models employed by young activists in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Adhering to the tenants of nonviolent resistance, their strategies and tactics evoked those so successfully employed by youth movements such as Otpor! in the run-up to the “color revolutions” of the early 2000s.

Act Three: From Vučić to Real Time

Aleksandar Vučić, who had previously been a member of Milošević’s Serbian Radical Party, founded the more moderate and pro-EU Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in 2008 with Tomislav Nikolić. In 2012, Nikolić won the presidential election and was replaced by Aleksandar Vučić as party leader. The Progressive Party won a landslide victory in the elections in 2014, and Vučić was elected Prime Minister and in 2017 Vucic was elected president. The line of Prime Minister and then president Vučić’s populist government became increasingly authoritarian and restrictive of media freedom. Vučić also selects the t prime minister of Serbia and in practice holds the highest political power in his hands.

During Vučić rule Serbia has suffered from democratic backsliding into authoritarianism, followed by a decline in media freedom and civil liberties.  Opposition figures accused the SNS of using public resources for political purposes and election monitor CRTA complained before the vote of a “chronic lack of pluralism” in Serbia.  Recently government policy is characterised as one of human rights violations, restrictions on freedom of expression and campaigns of harassment against the opposition figures, journalists and media outlets.  Today the largest political parties in the National Assembly are the populist Serbian Progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia, that with its partners, hold more than a supermajority number of seats.

President Aleksandar Vucic claimed a re-election victory in the country’s snap December 2023 elections, with his SNS, winning some 47% of the vote. Opposition parties under the Serbia Against Violence (SPN) banner were well behind with around 23%. The vote was almost immediately marred by accusations of irregularities. The International Election Observation Mission said in a statement that “serious irregularities, including vote-buying and ballot box stuffing were observed”.

Milos Vucevic, the leader of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party became prime minister in May 2024 and he resigned in January 2025 amid student-led anti-corruption protests following the November 2024 collapse of roof of a railway station in Novi Sad on 1 November, which killed 15 people.  Vučić, widely seen to have sacrificed his prime minister to protect his position, has ruled out forming a transitional government and holding elections in six months. Echoing Russian narratives, he has described the protests as a western-orchestrated ploy to oust him from power and destroy Serbia.

Epilogue: My conclusions

The current protests in Serbia, if successful, could lead to the ouster of the country’s current president, especially if the student movement receives direct support from the broad middle class. What is essential for me to see is whether the situation will get worse, better, or remain the same without Vučić.

I would personally describe an Otpor!-type strategy as an anarchist but well-organized, military but non-violent method of organizing mass demonstrations, coups, or even revolutions. Post-coup governance is another matter entirely.

In the years that followed overthrow of Slobodan Milošević Serbia underwent a protracted transition that included the assassination of a reformist prime minister, the resurgence of the far-right Serbian Radical Party and a legacy of corruption and nepotism that continues to pervade its politics. Otpor! disbanded soon after Milošević’s departure.  An intensely heterogeneous movement comprised of leftists and conservatives, monarchists and republicans, nationalists and cosmopolitans, Otpor! lost the glue that bound it together, Otpor! members could not agree on how to proceed.

The overthrow of Milosevic eventually led to the current situation, the Arab Spring, initiated by a liberal student movement, led to the rise of the conservative Muslim Brotherhood and then the military in Egypt. Iran’s “green movement” shrank when the government restricted the use of social media and the internet by urban youth, and when the uneducated rural population rushed to support the government.

Even in traditional constitutional states, mass demonstrations do not necessarily lead to results. For example, in Israel, I have participated in massive demonstrations in Tel Aviv several times before and during the current war. Despite legitimate demands and demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of citizens every weekend for a couple of years, and despite the fact that, according to opinion polls, about 70% of the citizens support the demands of the demonstrators, power in Israel will not change until the current government loses its slim majority in the Knesset, either through internal factors or elections.

Lessons learned: Movements that are defined solely on the basis of a dictator’s ousting have little merit once that dictator is gone. Moreover, movements that fail to identify themselves in positive terms—as for something beyond the abstraction of “democracy,” rather than simply against a sitting regime—are unlikely to withstand the tests of time.

Sources e.g:  The Guardian,  From Resistance to Revolution and Back Again: What Egyptian Youth Can Learn From Otpor When Its Activists Leave Tahrir Square, Carnegie Council


Article first published in Conflicts by Ariel Rusila online publication

Friday, February 28, 2025

Gaza – Saturday, March 1, 2025~~?

February 28, 2025

The first phase of the three-phase hostage and ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas ends on Saturday, March 1, 2025. Under the agreement, 602 terrorist prisoners will then be released in exchange for the bodies of four slain Israeli hostages. Of the prisoners to be released, 50 are serving life sentences, many of whom were responsible for orchestrating the horrific suicide bombings of the mid-1990s.

Saturday’s exchange of hostages for terrorists marks the end of the first phase of the agreement. There are no signs from either side of the warring parties or the various mediators that Israel and Hamas are close to reaching an agreement on implementing the second phase of the hostage and ceasefire agreement.

Saturday, March 1, 2025~~?

US Ambassador Steve Witkoff has been trying to broker an extension of the first phase of the ceasefire. Such an extension would specifically include the release of hostages deemed to be in need of immediate medical attention. The remaining hostages are all men under 50, and each would require Israel to pay higher “ransoms” than convicted terrorists to be released. It is unlikely that an extension of the first phase would cover all living hostages, as Hamas can be expected to want to hold some to achieve its larger political goals in the war.

The hardening of attitudes in Israel is also illustrated by the announcement on Thursday, February 27, 2025, by Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen that Israel will not withdraw from the so-called Philadelphia Corridor in Gaza as required by the ceasefire agreement. He stated that Israeli forces would not withdraw until three key goals were achieved: the full return of prisoners, the removal of Hamas from power, and the complete disarmament of Gaza. Israeli forces also consider their presence in the area essential to prevent weapons smuggling. Israel was expected to begin withdrawing from the Philadelphia Corridor on Saturday, the last day of the first phase of the ceasefire, and to complete the withdrawal within eight days.

Israeli politicians outside the government have presented their own “after-the-day” plans for Gaza. Left-wing leader Yair Golan called for moderate Palestinian forces to control Gaza while preserving the IDF’s freedom of action.

Yair Lapid, the leader of the center-right opposition, presented a plan that called for Egypt to take responsibility for Gaza for 15 years, during which the international community would wipe out Egypt’s $155 billion foreign debt. Lapid explained that Israel cannot accept Hamas remaining in power, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is unable to govern Gaza, the Israeli occupation is undesirable, and the continued chaos poses a serious security threat to Israel. At the same time, Egypt’s economy is on the verge of collapse and threatens the stability of Egypt and the entire Middle East. Lapid said that over the course of 15 years, Gaza would be rebuilt and the conditions for self-rule would be created.

Lapid proposed that the current ceasefire be ended until all hostages are released, with Egypt assuming control of Gaza through a UN Security Council resolution, defined as “custodianship,” with the goal of transferring the Gaza Strip to the PA government after a process of reform and deradicalization, with measurable criteria. At the same time, a reconstruction process would begin under Egyptian supervision, with Saudi Arabia and the Abraham Accords signatories participating in working groups, and the United States investing in Gaza. He also called on Egypt to allow any Gazan who wants to leave and has somewhere to go to do so in a regulated manner.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is currently (27/02/2025) in Riyadh to discuss an Arab plan for Gaza. Arab states are expected to discuss a post-war reconstruction plan for Gaza, possibly to counter US President Donald Trump’s proposal to redevelop the Strip under US control. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are reviewing the Arab plan in Riyadh before it is presented at a planned Arab summit in Cairo on March 4. The plan for Gaza could include up to $20 billion for reconstruction in the territory. The proposal includes the formation of a Palestinian national committee to govern Gaza without Hamas involvement and international participation in reconstruction without transferring Palestinians abroad. Egypt’s initial proposal is reported to have been a five-year plan for Gaza reconstruction, during which Gazans would be resettled in safe zones inside Gaza.

The EU, a major donor to the Palestinians, presented its position to the Israeli authorities in talks in Brussels on 24 February as part of the EU-Israel Association Council, the first such meeting since 2022. The EU supports the return of Gazans to their homes in Gaza and has pledged to contribute to their reconstruction.

According to Maher al-Namoura, a Fatah spokesman, the Palestinian Authority is capable of governing and rebuilding Gaza. He made his remarks in a recent discussion on the social media of Saudi Arabia’s interactive news channel Al Hadath. This reflects the PA’s policy since 2007 – when Hamas illegally pushed it out of Gaza in 2007 – that it should govern Gaza. Fatah is the largest faction in the PA.

My assessment

My assessment of the implementation of the second phase of the Hamas-Israel agreement, at least in the form previously outlined, is even more pessimistic than before. The reason is the numerous violations of the first agreement and the treatment of the hostages, which shocked the Israelis in particular. Tensions are also increasing due to the bus bombing in the Tel Aviv area a week ago, which, if successful (only two buses exploded at the depot), would have been very devastating. The attack was carried out by West Bank terrorists but Hamas took responsibility for them.

The first shock was the starving appearance of the three released hostages, the second was the inferior carnivalization of the release event by Hamas, the third was the return of the mother, baby and child under 5 years old of the Bibas family in coffins, the fourth was that one body was a completely unknown Arab woman (later corrected to the right person) and the fifth was when it was discovered that a 9-month-old baby and a 4-year-old had been slaughtered by Hamas already in November 2023 (Hamashan claimed that the family died in Israeli airstrikes, so no signs were found in the autopsies).

If no agreement is reached to extend the first phase, Israel is preparing to resume intense fighting with US support. It is hoped that the credibility of this threat will persuade Hamas to extend the agreement.

In the second phase of the ceasefire, the remaining 59 hostages would be released, Israel would withdraw completely from Gaza, and a permanent ceasefire would be established. Of the hostages, 24-27 are believed to still be alive. The current Israeli government does not want to withdraw from Gaza until all hostages are returned, and as long as Hamas poses a military threat to the country,

A renewed outbreak of fighting, should the ceasefire collapse, will occur in a vastly different global strategic environment than the one that prevailed when the war broke out in October 2023. The Iranian “ring of fire” that surrounded Israel in 2023 has broken in Lebanon and Syria (but not in Yemen), while the US administration today no longer places limits on Israeli firepower.

In any case, I assume that in the coming weeks there will be intensive negotiations on extending the first phase of the agreement. During this time, Israel will probably conclude the purge of Hamas terrorist cells in the West Bank, and the moderate Arab countries will present their own post-war plan for Gaza.

Sources include Jerusalem PostBICOM , TheNewArab


Article first published (in Finnish) in Ariel-Israelista suomeksi online publication

Sunday, February 9, 2025

A Game Changer for the Middle East


February 9, 2025

US President Donald Trump’s vision for Gaza has been met with a largely negative reception around the world. The initiative has been described as outrageous, illegal, ethnic cleansing, a violation of international order, forced displacement, impossible to implement, dramatic, shocking, etc. On the other hand, it has been described as “out of the box” thinking, a panacea, a masterstroke, radical, unconventional, etc.

From my perspective, Trump’s vision is a game changer, the cards have now been redistributed, disregarding the traditional rules, resulting in a pragmatic plan that promises a better future and is feasible due to the presenter.

Trump’s vision

President Trump presented his Gaza vision a little over two weeks ago and has since returned to it on two occasions, also presenting clarifications. The main features of the Trump plan’s control elements:

  • After the end of the Gaza war, Israel will hand over the Gaza Strip to US control in terms of Gaza and Hamas; US soldiers would not be needed in Gaza.
  • The United States will “clean up the demolition site”, remove the booby traps and mines laid by Hamas, as well as unexploded ordnance, of which there are estimated to be around 30,000 in Gaza.
  • The cleanup and The reconstruction of the areas in question, either selectively or by transferring Gazans elsewhere, either to the Gaza security zones or to areas or countries primarily allocated to Egypt and Jordan, has a “humanitarian heart” for “shorter or longer periods of time”.
  • Under one leadership and with international funding, Gaza will be rebuilt as the “Riviera of the Middle East”.

In addition to the Gaza vision, Trump has announced that he will issue a statement in March 2025 recognizing Israeli sovereignty in Judea and Samaria. If this happens, it will inspire a force to implement reactions and change the dynamics of the regional conflict.

A game move?

Trump’s vision has shocked the Middle East, his opponents and his domestic allies. The question has not been answered by a tweet but by an idea that he has already presented three times, most recently at an official press conference on February 4, 2024. Thus, and since the world’s most influential political leader is involved, the proposal should be taken very seriously. Since it also concerns Donald Trump, there will also be different perspectives on this.

  • Firstly, it may partly be a domestic political tactic with a wild idea to divert journalists and the public from other, perhaps more prosaic, disputes.
  • Secondly, it may be a negotiation opening to maximize, in order to finally force the other parties involved, after decades of fruitless negotiations, condemnatory high-flying resolutions and general inquisitorial efforts, to take a position on a concrete model that can also be implemented without the participation of the other parties involved.
  • Thirdly, it may be a so-called “mad man’s” tactic – which has been used by, for example, President Putin – when the absence of a presenter creates uncertainty among the interlocutors about this real solution.

Israel Already Acting on Trump’s Vision

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz on Thursday ordered the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to prepare a plan “to allow the voluntary departure of Gaza residents”… “I am preparing President Trump for a bold initiative that would allow a large portion of the Gaza population to move under a different agreement,” according to a Defense Ministry statement. Katz said Trump’s plan “will take several years, during which time Palestinians will be integrated into host countries while facilitating long-term reconstruction efforts in a demilitarized and [neighboring] Gaza free of threats in the post-Hamas era.”

According to Katz, countries such as Spain, Ireland and Norway, which have all accused Israel of violating international law during its war in Gaza, would be “legally obligated to accept any Gazans who arrange to enter their territory.”

Gazans’ willingness to leave

According to the propaganda of Palestinian figures and al-Jazeera (Hamas), Gazans do not want to leave anywhere. However, in addition to the elite who have left, there is also a desire to leave among ordinary Gazans.

In 2015, Fatah personnel claimed that over 90 percent of Gazans wanted to leave because of the Hamas regime. Recent surveys show that there is a reason for the desire to leave among Gazans. According to a 2023 survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Research (PSR) (conducted from September 28 to October 8, 2023), 31% of Gazans expressed a desire to emigrate from abroad, and nearly half (44%) of 18-29 year-olds were considering emigrating. The most desired destination was Turkey, followed by Germany, Canada, the United States and Qatar.

Poll info from Palestinian pollster @KShikaki
Poll info from Palestinian pollster @KShikaki
Poll info from Palestinian pollster @KShikaki

Dr. Mohimer Abu-Saada, a political scientist who left Gaza during the war and now lives with his family in Cairo, said: “Gaza is now a place where you can only leave. Most of the residents of the strip have become refugees, and there is no infrastructure in Gaza.”

“Before October 7, fleeing Gaza was the most popular dream for Palestinians. The atmosphere, especially among the youth, was one of complete despair, and this may have been one of the reasons why Hamas started the war – to save itself from civil unrest,” said S., a Gazan media figure who fled to Egypt with his family during the war, according to Ynetnews.

According to UN sources, around 133,000 people, about 7% of Gaza’s population, left between 7 October 2023 and 6 May 2024, when the IDF took control of the Rafah crossing. Before the IDF took control of the crossing, a smuggling industry flourished in Rafah, with wealthier Gazans bribed their way into Egypt. After that, movement across the Gaza-Egypt border for Gazans virtually stopped. Before this, the price of a permit ranged from $6,000 to $12,000 per person, allowing the wealthy to establish a community of around 100,000 Gazans in Cairo and join the tens of thousands who lived in the city before the war.

According to the Palestinian Authority, 860,000 people have left Gaza since Hamas took control in 2007. Evidence of this trend was seen last September, a month before the war, when chaos erupted in Gaza as thousands of Gazans crowded into the “Passi” travel agency, which issued visas to Turkey. The 18,000 permits issued were barely enough to meet the enormous demand.

My assessment

I personally welcome Trump’s vision for two reasons. First, it completely re-arranges the geopolitical playing field, at least in the Middle East, by bringing a concrete, viable proposition to the table instead of aimless whining. Second, the proposal, at its best, could implement what I consider to be the most pragmatic Middle East peace-loving Sinai and Jordanian options for the long-term establishment of a Palestinian state or Palestinian autonomy while meeting Israel’s security needs.

Currently, almost everyone other than the White House and Israel (according to opinion polls, 82 percent of Israeli Jews support “encouraging immigration” of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip) opposes Trump’s vision, especially when it comes to “population transfer.” For example, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas has suggested that some Gazans be relocated to the West Bank on condition that a new Palestinian city be built for them. The area west of Jericho has been identified as a possible location for this development.

According to the UN, direct infrastructure damage is $18.5 billion, and the cost of clearing the rubble alone is estimated at $1.2 billion. The total cost of rebuilding Gaza is estimated at $40 billion, and could extend to 2040 or beyond. Trump’s previous “deal of the century” includes, among other things, the reconstruction of Gaza, the construction of an airport and a designated port in El Arish, and a large industrial park in Sinai. Trump’s latest proposal – apart from the refugee resettlement – ​​is seen in Egypt as a sign that the US president is committed to rebuilding Gaza. (Deal of the Century Finally Announced! [Op-Ed])

Understandably, both Egypt and Jordan have serious security concerns about millions of Palestinians being resettled in their territories. These concerns can be overcome by defining for the Palestinians their own demarcated and controlled areas where new camps or cities are located. After a de-radicalization program and the development of social structures, these areas could then, if they so wish, become independent or, for example, form a confederation with host states.

As Trump’s vision is implemented, well-meaning Palestinian advocates may have to consider whether they want to keep people trapped in a devastated enclave for perhaps a decade simply to avoid accusations of ethnic cleansing.

Palestinians return home to Gaza City on February 2, 2025. Approximately 90% of Gaza residents were displaced during the Israel-Hamas war, according to the UN. Credit: Ali Jadallah/Anadolu/Getty Images

My previous article on the subject: Trump’s pragmatic vision for Gaza

Sources include The Washington Post, Jerusalem PostCNNYnetnews


This article first appeared in the online publication Ariel-Israelista suomeksi

Thursday, January 30, 2025

Trump’s pragmatic vision for Gaza


January 30, 2025

“Almost everything is demolished and people are dying there…So I’d rather get involved with some of the Arab nations and build housing at a different location where maybe they can live in peace for a change.” (Donald Trump)

US President Donald Trump said on Saturday [January 25, 2025] that he had spoken with Jordan’s King Abdullah II about relocating Palestinian refugees to Jordan and Egypt. He also said he planned to speak to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi about the issue. Trump described Gaza as a “demolition site,” adding “I would rather get involved with some of the Arab nations and build housing at a different location where maybe they can live in peace for a change.” He added that the change “could be temporary” or “could be long-term.”

President Trump’s idea is reminiscent of the three-state (restoration) model I have previously proposed, in which Gaza, formerly under Egyptian control, would be returned to direct Egyptian control in an expanded form (the Sinai Option), and Areas A and B of the West Bank, formerly under Jordanian control and now under the control of the Palestinian Authority, would be returned to Jordanian control (the Jordan Option). This model has not gained significant international support, but with President Trump, the model could perhaps be updated to be viable.

From my perspective, this Three-State [restoration] model is both pragmatic and feasible, and more relevant than ever. The solution would restore the situation – with the exception of Israeli settlements in Area C – to the situation between the 1949 armistice and the 1967 “Six-Day War.”

The Jordanian Option

For 19 years, Judea and Samaria were part of Jordan after it was occupied by the Arab states following Israel’s independence in 1948, and after Jordan established its settlements in the occupied territory. By also annexing Areas A and B of the area currently known as the West Bank to Jordan, the Palestinians would become part of already developed state structures, regional self-government solutions through autonomy, federal or confederation models would secure the later developed cultural identity of the Palestinians and, on the other hand, Jordan’s internal security.

With the Jordanian Option, Israel would gain a neighbor with whom it already has a decades-old peace treaty and experience of peaceful coexistence.

With the development of the community structures and democracy in the annexed area, the Palestinians could also form their own state in the longer term from the areas they control and possibly Gaza.

In Israel, the so-called ‘Jordanian Option’ always extends to the so-called Until the Allon Plan of 1967. According to the “Jordan is Palestine” idea, a Palestinian state already exists in the form of Jordan east of the Jordan River. Similarly, a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation has been proposed as an idea for decades.

The Sinai Option

The Sinai Option is not a new option for resolving the conflict between Egypt, Gaza, and Israel. According to a report by the Middle East Monitor (MEMO) [01.09.2014], Egypt offered Palestinian Authority President Abbas a Palestinian state in Sinai. Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi offered the Palestinian Authority 620 square miles of land adjacent to Gaza in exchange for giving up demands for the 1967 borders to establish a Palestinian state. PA President Abbas rejected the proposal. Speaking at a meeting of Fatah leaders in Ramallah, Abbas said: “The plan proposed in 1956 included the annexation of 1,600 square kilometers from the Sinai Peninsula to the Gaza Strip to accommodate Palestinian refugees.” He continued: “The plan is being proposed again, but we rejected it.”

The original Egyptian initiative proposed expanding the Gaza Strip to five times its current size and settling all Gazans and Palestinian refugees in a facility to be established there. In addition, the Palestinian Authority would be granted autonomy in Palestinian cities in the West Bank in exchange for abandoning Palestinian demands to return to the 1967 borders.

The Sinai Option became the focus of the 2004 Herzliya Conference, a gathering where Israel’s political, academic, and security elites traditionally develop new policy ideas. In 2004, a so-called tripartite model was proposed for the option, in which part of Sinai would be handed over to the Palestinian state, Israel would get most of the West Bank, and Egypt would get a land corridor through the Negev desert to Jordan. Another variation was the Giora Eiland plan in 2004, according to which Israel would withdraw from Gaza, which was implemented a year later, the expansion of Gaza into Sinai, for which Egypt would in turn receive land from the Negev as compensation, and 89% of the West Bank would be handed over to the Palestinians. (The Herzliya Papers and Eiland’s plan can be found on my main blog document library page)

In the last decade, the option has resurfaced, with PLO veteran Farouk Kaddoumi proposing in an interview the return of the West Bank to Jordan and the formation of a federation or confederation between the Palestinian Authority and Jordan. (See more Palestinians Put Jordanian Option on the Table )

Short-term solution

With Gaza’s already poor water and sewage systems partially destroyed, power supply minimal, roads and buildings largely destroyed, and the remaining hospitals operating at their limits, a humanitarian crisis has arisen in a situation where most Gazans have been forced to move away from the fighting to safer areas

Gazans can in principle move to three areas:

  1. Gazans can return to their home areas; the problem is that most of the buildings and infrastructure in the area have been destroyed, especially in the northern parts of Gaza.
  2. Gazans can be placed in designated protected areas in southern Gaza. The downside is that Hamas would likely exploit this to protect its fighters.
  3. Gazans can temporarily move to Sinai. Egypt is currently strongly opposed to the idea.

Theoretically, Gazans could be accepted as refugees around the world, but since no one is ready to do so in practice, the options are limited to Gaza and its surrounding areas.

I have previously presented the Sinai Option-based Day After the Gaza War plan to immediately address the humanitarian crisis for Gazans, to rebuild the devastated Palestinian territory in the medium term, and to implement a two-state solution in the long term.

In my opinion, the only practical and quick solution is to build a temporary Gaza settlement on the Egyptian-Gaza border, whereby Gazans who have moved to safe areas in southern Gaza would only need to move 1-10 kilometers southwest of their current locations.

Rebuilding Gaza in the traditional way compared to the Sinai Option would take significantly more time and resources, and even so, the reconstructed area would not be nearly as viable as a larger virgin area.

Gaza has been rebuilt again and again after previous conflicts, but Hamas has always taken some of the funds intended for reconstruction for its own use, including building the Gaza Metro, missile and weapons production, and the luxury lifestyle of its elite. If Turkish and Egyptian construction companies are now responsible for the construction work instead of Hamas, under the strict supervision of the international community, previous mistakes can be minimized.

The implementation of the Sinai Option is now even more timely than before. Trump is right to describe Gaza as a “demolition site”, the clearance alone is estimated to take at least five years, even longer if the dead in the ruins and tunnels are to be found. The reason for adopting the option is that when most of Gaza’s infrastructure is destroyed, clearing the area would take significantly more time and money.

With the Sinai Option, Gazans would be able to return to normal life at least half a decade earlier than in the traditional way – without slowing down the clearance process. Temporary accommodation with services in the virgin area can also be implemented quickly and with high quality. A good example of this is the Mina Valley, which is located 8 kilometers southeast of the city of Mecca in the Hejaz region of Saudi Arabia and is commonly known as the “city of tents”. Mina is the world’s largest tent city, built on an area of ​​about 20 km2, and can accommodate up to three million pilgrims in over 100,000 air-conditioned tents. (I wrote about this earlier in my article about Saudi Mina as a model for the Gaza camp)

My assessment

During Trump’s previous term, the US administration discussed with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan a regional “umbrella” for possible peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In my opinion, promoting a Palestinian state based on the Sinai and Jordan options could lead to a regional peace process that would be feasible through a mutual agreement between Egypt, Jordan and Israel, supported by the Arab League. The emergence of a viable and peaceful Palestinian state would require at least a decade of construction work in this scenario as well. This is my opinion, at least based on my experiences in Kosovo, having participated in work there on the ground.

In short, if Trump’s vision were realized in the short term, it would significantly improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza, accelerate community and housing construction to meet the needs of Gazans, eliminate the Hamas threat to Egypt and Israel, and in the longer term lay the foundation for a viable Palestinian territory as an autonomy or independent state.

The Sinai option, if implemented, would affect Gazans and other Palestinians moving there, while the Jordan option would also allow Palestinians in the West Bank to benefit more widely from the project. Israel, in turn, would benefit from the security of the options, along with its peaceful neighbors with clearly defined borders.

Trump’s vision of rebuilding Gaza and transforming it into a thriving coastal state, a kind of larger Miami, is welcome and pragmatic rather than theoretical and high-flown statements. In this sense, the vision also has a chance of being realized if a “deal” can be agreed with the parties involved.

Sources include BBC , CNN and my previous articles:

Road-map to 2-State solution. 
Sinai Option again
Palestinians Put Jordanian Option on the Table
Saudien Minasta malli gazalaisten leirille
A Day After the Gaza War -Plan by Ariel Rusila

The article first appeared in the Finnish online publication Ariel-Israelista Suomeksi

Wednesday, December 11, 2024

Aspects of al-Assad’s Quick Overthrowe in Syria


flagS

In Assad’s flag, the red represents the blood shed in the Syrian revolution. White is for peace. Black symbolizes Arab oppression. The green stars in the middle represent Syria and Egypt – the two founders of the United Arab Republic (1958-1961). In the opposition groups’ flag, the red has been replaced by green, and the three red stars represent Syria’s three main regions: Aleppo, Damascus and Deir el-Zor. The flag originally flew during the country’s struggle for independence from France.

In Syria, an operation launched by rebels just two weeks ago quickly achieved its first goal – the capture of Syria’s second city, Aleppo. From there, a little over a week later, the rebel alliance reached Damascus and ended the half-century-long rule of the al-Assad family on Sunday, December 8, 2024. How the blitzkrieg succeeded.

Al-Assad’s ouster came at a time when his allies were unable to muster the decisive defenses that had sustained him for years. Weakened by Israeli strikes, Iranian- and Hezbollah-backed forces were unable to build a proper ground defense, and although Russian fighter jets attacked the militants early in their campaign, Moscow’s military support for the rebels – already strained by the war in Ukraine – evaporated as the opposition’s advance accelerated.

In November and December 2024, several Israeli airstrikes targeted Syrian weapons depots, significantly altering the military dynamics in the region. Before the rebel offensive, the strikes were aimed at denying Hezbollah advanced weapons and dismantling possible chemical weapons facilities. An intensified air campaign followed the collapse of the Assad regime, and the US also carried out similar strikes on ISIS’s expanded territory.

Below is a timeline of the change of power compiled by Reuters:

In addition to the decline in external support for al-Assad’s army, internal reasons for the rebels’ success, including morale, can also be found, such as:

  • Simultaneous attacks by the rebels on multiple fronts, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed groups.
  • More than a decade of war has caused physical and mental fatigue among soldiers; years of war, increasing casualties and the loss of key positions have weakened soldiers’ morale.
  • Corruption and poor strategic decisions have undermined trust in the military hierarchy.
  • Syria’s collapsing economy has made it challenging to procure supplies, pay soldiers or maintain operations.
  • Strategic isolation: The rebels gained a strategic advantage by cutting off the government’s supply lines, especially in critical areas such as Aleppo and Homs, and thus the connection between the coast and Damascus.

The map below shows the situation on December 9, 2024:

Source: Reuters, among othersConflicts by Ariel Rusila


The article first appeared in the Finnish online publication Ariel-Israelista Suomeksi