One
should note that question about northern municipalities of Kosovo is
only one - even if a core one - aspect in Kosovo framework. During
NATO-bombing and after ethnic cleansing implemented by Kosovo Albanians,
nearly 200.000 Serbs and Romas escaped to Serbia where they are living
like internal refugees many of them in temporary conditions. Despite
naïve multiethnic ideas in Brussels they have not any intentions to risk
their lives by returning hostile environment and their destroyed homes.
In my opinion international community – which allowed this problem to
happen – should finance a housing program in Serbia for these refugees
(or officially IDPs). Second core question is the fate of some half of
remaining Kosovo Serbs namely those who are living in isolated enclaves
outside northern municipalities in Kosovo. These enclaves are protected
by KFOR troops and should be so long as Pristina administrated part of
Kosovo is so hostile as it still is.
High Tension in Kosovo North
Tension
has been high in northern Kosovo since last July. The situation
escalated when Kosovo Serbs put up roadblocks and barricades to stop the
deployment of Kosovo customs officers to border points between north
Kosovo municipalities and Serbia. Several rounds of violence has
occurred; a Kosovo policeman was killed and several NATO troops injured.
The north was the scene of unrest in November, when some 50 soldiers
from the NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping force were hurt in a dispute between
the two sides over control of border crossings. This Pristina’s failed
attempt to seize the northern boundary with support by EULEX and KFOR
have demonstrated that using force does not solve dispute.
The
governing coalition in Belgrade has called on the Serbs to end the
blockade, refrain from violence and abandon the referendum and same time
several EU nations, especially Germany, want Serbia's government to
make deals with Pristina so that Serbia could get EU candidate status
this Spring.
In
Brussels, the EU said it was preparing for a new round of talks between
Belgrade and Pristina aimed at easing tensions in northern Kosovo.
"There is a particular situation in the north that needs a solution, but
neither violence nor barricades, or a referendum contributes to it," EU
spokeswoman Maja Kocijancic said. "Only a dialogue can achieve that."
(Source AP
) Earlier the EU pressured Serbia intensely in November and December,
demanding that it force the northern Kosovo Serbs to remove their
barricades in the name of “freedom of movement”. KFOR fought several
actions against barricades, inflicting – and taking – casualties.
Time to Exit-strategy?
However
the western powers have on the drawing board also an other strategy of
fostering change to avoid reinforcing the status quo in the north. The
press in
Pristina has reported about secret meetings between the Kosovo
government, the US ambassador and chief of the International Civilian
Office (ICO), Pieter Feith,on a new plan to push the UN out of the
north. An “EU House” will be established in the north to promote
the “European perspective” and to cooperate with “progressive forces”
willing to work with Pristina, “parallel” municipalities in the north
would remain unrecognized and “Advisory Councils led by moderate Kosovo
Serbs” chosen by Pristina taking place from democratically elected
bodies in Leposavic, Zubin Potok and Zvecan. To make space for these
innovations the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Administration
in Mitrovica (UAM), that administers north Mitrovica under UN Security
Council Resolution 1244, will be closed.
Also the International Steering Group (ISG) had meeting on January 24th
in Vienna to deside its 2012 program for Kosovo. Despite its name ISG
represents only countries which have advocated Kosovo Albanian
separatism, cover costs of Kosovo Albanian state-building efforts.cover
costs of Kosovo Albanian state-building efforts and try to underestimate
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 – which btw represents in Kosovo
highest international law. Anyway ISG issued a communique calling upon
the government of Kosovo to continue to implement the Ahtisaari Plan,
aiming to complete outstanding elements so that the period of
“supervised independence” could terminate by the end of this year. While
the outcome both politically and on operation theatre has been modest
as best and the results related to investments almost non-visible, ISG
probably his hurry to implement fast exit-strategy.Marko Prelec from International Crisis Group concludes well the situation now since last summer tensions started in his post Update on Northern Kosovo Barricades. A quote:
The situation shows with crystal clarity the folly of the “freedom of movement” campaign, which cost tens of millions of Euros (flying Kosovo officials to, and from, the border day after day runs into serious money), dozens of injuries, made travel more difficult for real people and achieved nothing. All this started because of the basic disputes between Kosovo and Serbia, over Kosovo’s independence and territorial integrity. Trying to use issues like freedom of movement – or the rule of law – as tools to change locals’ minds about sovereignty issues, rather than as ends in themselves, just damages the tool. The dispute isn’t a technicality and cannot be resolved as though it were.
… or back to Dialogue?
Dialogue
between Belgrade and Pristina has poor history. Serbs and Albanians
have been in negotiations and talks frequently over the past two decades
– from the tentative efforts of the 1990s to the doomed talks in
Rambouillet, France, in 1999 and the later “status” talks between 2005
(Ahtisaari’s pseudo-talks) and 2007 (“Troika” led talks). None of these
has led to tangible results and left outsiders imposing an outcome, be
it NATO intervention or proposing the Ahtisaari plan.
The
original or better to say official aim of international community was
to build “standards before status”, on 2005 the task was seen impossible
so the slogan changed to “standards and status”. Even this was
unrealistic so Feb. 2008 “European”standards were thrown away to garbage
and “status without standards” precipitately accepted by western
powers. For international community I don’t see any success story with
this backward progress. Thus the multiethnic idea is far away despite
EU’s billions. The remaining Serbs in Kosovo are barricaded into
enclaves keeping their lives mainly with help of international KFOR
troops or in de facto separated Serb majority region in North Kosovo.
This has changed former multiethnic province more mono-ethnic one.
The
new situation has forced also International Crisis Group (ICG) to admit
the defeat of its Kosovo policy recommendations during last decade. ICG
has acted as informal extension of U.S. State Department however
pretending to be neutral mediator and think tank. During earlier
“status” negotiations 2005 it endorsed preconditions before talks and
afterwards supported sc Ahtisaari plan. Now in their new analysis ”Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion” ICG sees Kosovo’s partition with land swap one of possible solutions during coming talks between Belgrad and Pristina.
The fact on the ground
is that northern part of Kosovo is integrated to Serbia like it always
has been, as well those parts south of Ibar river, which are not
ethnically cleansed by Kosovo Albanians. Serbia still runs
municipalities, courts, police, customs and public services, and the EU
Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) has been unable to deploy more than a token
presence there.
During
the course of events, the Ahtisaari Plan was implemented in south
Kosovo, the north, however, remained outside Kosovo institutions and the
ICO, and the Ahtisaari Plan was not implemented there. The Ahtisaari
Plan derived a formula that would allow Kosovo Serbs to have their own
local institutions and communal life with continued linkages to Serbia,
but within the framework of a multi-ethnic Kosovo. If partition option –
which in my opinion is pragmatic, the best and even realistical way to
solve Kosovo conflict – is not yet possible so then the Ahtisaari Plan
might be temporary base for compromise. The Plan however needs some
modification. A new follow-up - entitled ‘The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo’ - is presented by TransConflict
and it might be achievable as the policy paper is authored by Gerard
Gallucci, the former UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica.
My Scenario
“Kosovo … a Serbian
province, occupied and now international protectorate administrated by
UN Kosovo mission; as quasi-independent pseudo-state has good change to
become next “failed” or “captured” state; today’s Kosovo is already
safe-heaven for war criminals, drug traffickers, international money
laundry and radical Wahhabists – unfortunately all are also allies of
western powers”.
(Ari Rusila)
US based Freedom House gave in their last report
(2012) rank partly free to Kosovo related to political rights and civil
liberties (5,4 points respectively), while Serbia got rank free (2,2)
and e.g also Croatia (1,2), Bulgaria (2,2) and Romania (2,2) got rank
free, while Bosnia-Herzegovina (4,3) and Albania (3,3) fell to category
partly free. (Note: Each country is assigned a numerical rating from 1
to 7 for both political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing
the most free and 7 the least free.) So even western powers must addmit
that despite billions of dollars for Kosovo state-building efforts
during last 12 years the outcome is that the protectorate still is among
the worst in region related to political rights and civil liberties.
One could ask why then Kosovo Serbs should go backwards by integrating
to that society when better the alternative could be integrate also
officially to more developed Serbia.
In
my opinion Kosovo will remain a frozen conflict probably whole this
decade. The western powers can not addmit – yet – that their
intervention was a mistake, international community can not addmit its
failure with capasity-/state-building efforts after squandering billions
of Euros, noor that instead of multiethnic democracy the out outcome
mono-ethnic tribe-society. EULEX etc will continue to build some
facades and pseudo-activities like it used to do, Pristina pretends that
north is integral part of their quasi-independent pseudo-state which
the North never has been, the Kosovo institutions do not exist in the
north, and it is very unlikely that they will be established there soon.
Hard-line Serbs keep claim about Kosovo as Serbian province, which it
indeed has been but after 1999 situation on the ground changed; instead
the today's government in Belgrade might change in next elections. What
is clear after referendum is that population in Kosovo's northern
municipalities does not want to integrate Pristina lead institutions,
they want to continue their living as part of Serbia like they always
have been, in short they want reunify northern municipalities with
Serbia again.
After
this quite pessimistic view one can ask if there is any other way
forward. From my point of view there is the negotiation option. But this
time negotiations should base facts on the ground instead of high-flown
ideas in Washington and Brussels, around negotiation table in addition
to Belgrade and Pristina representatives should be also local
stakeholders from northern Kosovo and selected by local population. The
referendum made positions clear for tripartite approach.
More eg in Kosovo: Two years of Pseudo-state